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Chen, Po-Lu (Ph.D., Economics) 
Three Essays on International Trade with a Focus on Intellectual  
Property Rights 
Thesis directed by Professor Keith E. Maskus 
 
 This thesis discusses three independent topics related to parallel trade and the 
nexus between intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection and the mode of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). A simple model and a numerical example are demonstrated 
in chapter 2 to show that even though parallel imports (PI) may reduce IPR holder’s 
incentive in investing in brand marketing due to free rider problem, investment in 
service will increase as a response to PI since service is excludable and it helps 
mitigate price competition by achieving product differentiation. In chapter 3, I 
investigate the impact of software piracy and PI in the video game market. Three 
interesting results are obtained. First, the software provider and the hardware 
manufacturer could both benefit from software piracy. Second, the hardware 
manufacturer may benefit from parallel imports (PI). Third, the consumers in the PI 
recipient country are not necessarily better off due to PI. Chapter 4 is an empirical 
study that discusses how IPR regime affects multinational firms’ ownership structure 
(joint venture or wholly owned subsidiaries) in the foreign market. By analyzing a 
firm-level panel data set from Taiwanese manufacturing multinational enterprises for 
the period 2003 to 2005, I find that Taiwanese manufacturing multinational firms are 
iv 
 
more likely to choose joint ventures if IPR protection in the FDI host country is strong. 
The estimation results suggest that one unit increase in IPR protection in the average 
country raises the probability of joint ventures by 13.5 percent. I also find that MNEs 
prefer wholly owned subsidiaries to joint ventures in host countries with large markets 
and high factor price as well as high average income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER I ................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER II .................................................................................................................. 7 
PARALLEL IMPORTS, SERVICE AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ........... 7 
1.  Introduction ............................................................................................ 7 
2.  Literature Review................................................................................. 10 
2.1 Price Discrimination and Retail Arbitrage ..................................... 11 
2.2 Vertical Price Control ..................................................................... 15 
2.3 Parallel Imports and Product Differentiation ................................. 18 
2.4 Bundling ......................................................................................... 19 
3.  The Model ............................................................................................ 20 
3.1 The Background ............................................................................. 20 
3.2 The Manufacturer and the Parallel Importer .................................. 21 
3.3 The Consumers .............................................................................. 22 
3.4 The Game Structure ....................................................................... 23 
4.  Solving the Model ................................................................................ 25 
4.1 Solving the Pricing Game in Country A ........................................ 26 
4.2 Solving the Entry Game ................................................................. 34 
5.  Parallel Imports and Investment .......................................................... 35 
5.1 Equilibrium Investment when Service Marketing is Considered .. 36 
5.2 Equilibrium Investment When Service Marketing 
   is Not Considered ........................................................................... 37 
5.3 A Numerical Example .................................................................... 37 
5.4 International Trade Cost ................................................................. 39 
6.  Conclusions .......................................................................................... 42 
CHAPTER III .............................................................................................................. 44 
OUTLAW INNOVATION, VIDEO GAME PIRACY AND PARALLEL 
IMPORTS ............................................................................................................ 44 
1.  Introduction .......................................................................................... 44 
2.  The Model ............................................................................................ 49 
2.1  The Benchmark: The Basic Model with No Piracy .................... 50 
2.2  Software Piracy When PI is Prohibited ...................................... 52 
2.3  Software Piracy When PI is Considered ..................................... 60 
3.  Welfare Analysis .................................................................................. 72 
vi 
 
3.1 Consumer’s welfare change with software piracy 
   when hardware PI is prohibited. .................................................... 72 
3.2 Welfare change due to parallel imports given software piracy ...... 74 
4.  Region-free Hardware .......................................................................... 85 
5.  Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................ 87 
Appendix ...................................................................................................... 90 
CHAPTER IV .............................................................................................................. 94 
MODES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: WHOLLY-OWNED OR JOINT 
VENTURE? FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM TAIWANESE 
MULTINATIONAL MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES .............................. 94 
1.  Introduction .......................................................................................... 94 
2.  Theoretical Consideration .................................................................. 101 
3.  The Econometric Specification and Data .......................................... 106 
4.  Econometric Theory ........................................................................... 113 
5.  Empirical Results ............................................................................... 116 
6.  Robustness Test .................................................................................. 126 
7.  Conclusions ........................................................................................ 133 
Appendix .................................................................................................... 135 
CHAPTER V ............................................................................................................. 137 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 137 
REFERENCE ............................................................................................................. 139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 2.1 Consumer’s payoff in country A .................................................. 23 
Table 2.2 Firms’ payoff matrix in country A.  (Ԗ ՜ 0 ൅) .......................... 33 
Table 2.3 Profit-maximizing investment in brand marketing 
    and service marketing .................................................................. 38 
Table 3.1 The strategies that are available for the manufacturer to adopt ... 70 
Table 3.2 Welfare change due to piracy ....................................................... 82 
Table 3.3 Welfare change due to PI ............................................................. 82 
Table 4.1 Shares of investors in each industry for the period 2003-2005 .... 99 
Table 4.2 Variable definition, basic statistics and data source ................... 112 
Table 4.3 Panel binary outcomes estimation results .................................. 118 
Table 4.4 Marginal effect (panel probit random effect model) .................. 120 
Table 4.5 Definition of industry dummy for foreign subsidiaries ............. 123 
Table 4.6 Panel binary outcomes estimation results (SID added) ............. 125 
Table 4.7 Two-sided panel tobit regression ............................................... 128 
Table 4.8 Estimation results in two-stage probit model with selection ..... 129 
Table 4.9 Estimation results in two-stage probit model with 
    selection for developing host economies ................................... 131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1 Demand curves for the bundle and the product .......................... 28 
Figure 2.2 Profit for different offering strategies ......................................... 34 
Figure 2.3 Changes in service investment due to PI .................................... 39 
Figure 2.4 Investment in brand marketing increases as trade cost rises ...... 41 
Figure 2.5 Iinvestment in service marketing decreases as trade cost rises .. 41 
Figure 2.6 Total investment decreases as trade cost rises ............................ 42 
Figure 3.1 The area where the firms can benefit from piracy ...................... 57 
Figure 3.2 The region where the hardware manufacturer 
     can benefit from permitting PI ................................................... 63 
Figure 3.3 The region where the hardware manufacturer 
     suffers from permitting PI (Empty Set) ..................................... 64 
Figure 3.4 The region where the hardware manufacturer 
     can benefit by accommodating PI .............................................. 69 
Figure 3.5 Consumer’s welfare change is positive when 
     software piracy is present. .......................................................... 74 
Figure 3.6 The region where consumers in country A are better off 
     if the manufacturer accommodates PI for 
     ሺ1 െ α െ c ൅ δሻ/2 ൒ 1/3 ൅ t .................................................... 78 
Figure 3.7 The region where consumers in country A are worse off 
     if the manufacturer accommodates PI for 
     ሺ1 െ α െ c ൅ δሻ/2 ൒ 1/3 ൅ t .................................................... 79 
Figure 3.8 The region where consumers in country A suffer from 
     accommodating PI for ሺ1 െ α െ c ൅ δሻ/2 ൏ 1/3 ൅ ݐ .............. 80 
Figure 3.9 The region where consumers in country B benefit from 
     accommodating PI for ሺ1 െ α െ c ൅ δሻ/2 ൏ 1/3 ൅ ݐ .............. 81 
Figure 4.1 The relationship between share of wholly-owned 
     subsidiaries and IPR protection in China ................................. 100 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection plays an important role in 
international trade agreements for recent years. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which sets minimum standards of IPR 
protection applied to members of World Trade Organization (WTO) was negotiated at 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994. With 
rapid technological development, more and more intellectual property questions 
raised in areas such as computer software, integrated circuits, biotechnology, 
entertainment, and publishing industries. In addition, with economic globalization, 
countries that produce IPR-intensive goods and services have more concern about IPR 
protection in foreign markets and therefore strengthening IPR protection is a key 
negotiating issue in international trade agreements.  
 Intellectual property law awards IPR holder exclusive rights to a variety of 
intangible assets, such as rights to produce, distribute, copy and license goods and 
technologies within the country. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial design 
rights and trade secrets are common types of intellectual property. What optimal level 
of IPR protection for a country should be is an interesting political issue. From an ex 
ante perspective, strong IPR protection provides incentives to inventors to engage in 
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developing new knowledge; however, from an ex post perspective, the exclusive 
rights result in efficiency loss since once the new knowledge is developed, social 
optima implies free access to the new knowledge. How to balance these two effects 
and find the optimal strength of IPR protection remains an empirical question. 
Analysis of IPR protection in an open economy becomes more complicated. A lot of 
factors affect the IPR holder’s choice of ways to serve the foreign country and the IPR 
protection strength in that country is important one. For example, a firm, the IPR 
holder, can choose to serve the foreign country by exports, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) or licensing. In an extreme case with absence of IPR protection in the foreign 
country, it is possible that IPR holder’s products are easily and fully imitated by 
foreign firms. That may drive the IPR holder out of the foreign market. As IPR 
protection gets stronger and it becomes profitable to serve the foreign market, exports 
may dominate FDI for weak IPR protection since FDI increases the risk of know-how 
being copied. With the same idea, for sufficiently strong IPR protection, international 
licensing could be more attractive. However, the nexus of IPR and entry mode needs 
further empirical investigation. 
 Another interesting economic issue in open economies arises due to different 
rules of exhaustion, which specifies the moment when the IPR holder’s control over 
the distribution of protected goods ceases. It generally occurs after first sale. In other 
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words, a IPR holder can no longer control over the distribution of protected goods 
after first sale in the national market. However, if the first sale occurs in country A, 
does the IPR holder still have the right to control over the distribution of the protected 
goods in country B? The answer to the above question varies under different doctrines 
of exhaustion- international exhaustion, national exhaustion and regional exhaustion. 
The answer is “No” if country B applies the concept of international exhaustion. The 
doctrine of international exhaustion indicates that the IPR holder’s rights to control 
over the distribution of the protected goods are deemed exhausted at the moment 
when the first sale occurs in any country around the world. National exhaustion means 
the aforementioned right exhausted within the country after first sale occurred in the 
same country. Under national exhaustion in country B, the answer to the question 
stated above is “Yes” since the IPR does not exhaust in country B. Regional 
exhaustion is a doctrine between national exhaustion and international exhaustion. It 
states that IPR exhausts within a region after first sale occurred in the same region. In 
our example, if country A and country B locate in the same region, then the IPR 
holder does not have the right to control over the distribution of the protected goods 
after first sale in country A since the right exhausts if country B adopts the doctrine of 
regional exhaustion. On the other hand, if country A and country B reside in different 
regions, then the IPR holder still has the right to control over the distribution of the 
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protected goods in country B. When prices vary across countries, international 
arbitrage, which is often called parallel trade, occurs if the doctrine of exhaustion 
allows the parallel trader to do so. For example, under the system of international 
exhaustion, parallel trade is allowed since the IPR holder can no longer control over 
further distribution of the goods after its first sale overseas. Parallel trade influences 
IPR holder’s pricing behavior and thus it has important welfare implications. Many 
theoretical studies investigate the nexus between IPR holder’s profit and parallel trade 
but the conclusion on whether parallel trade is harmful for the IPR holder is still 
ambiguous. To have a clear picture on recent development in parallel trade analysis, 
we will give a short review of related literature in chapter 2.  
 This dissertation discusses three independent topics related to parallel trade and 
the nexus between IPR protection and the mode of FDI. In chapter 2, the relationship 
between parallel imports (PI), service and investment is discussed. I develop a simple 
model and show that parallel trade does not necessarily lead to uniform pricing across 
countries because the IPR holder can respond to PI by engaging in bundling service to 
mitigate price competition. Chapter 2 also shows that investment in excludable 
service increases when parallel trade is allowed. 
 Chapter 3 analyzes welfare change in the video game market that faces software 
piracy and PI. Rather than just focusing on piracy in a closed economy, this chapter 
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also discusses the impact of PI inspired by the modification chip, which is a device 
that allows the user to bypass legal safeguard. I develop a simple model with one 
monopolistic hardware manufacturer and one monopolistic software provider (where 
the hardware and the software are perfect complements) selling their products in two 
countries to show three results that are in contrast to general expectation. First, the 
software provider and the hardware manufacturer could both benefit from software 
piracy. Second, the hardware manufacturer may benefit from PI. Third, the consumers 
in the PI recipient country are not necessarily better off due to PI.  
 Chapter 4 empirically tests the nexus between mode of FDI (joint venture or 
wholly owned subsidiaries) and IPR protection in the host country. By analyzing a 
firm-level panel data set from Taiwanese manufacturing multinational enterprises for 
the period 2003 to 2005, I find that MNEs are more likely to choose joint ventures if 
IPR protection in the FDI host country is strong. The estimation results suggest that 
one unit increase in IPR protection in the average country raises the probability of 
joint ventures by 13.5 percent. I also find that MNEs prefer wholly owned 
subsidiaries to joint ventures in host countries with large markets and high factor price 
as well as high average income.  
 How to set the rules for IPR protection is complicated and should be concerned 
case by case. For example, exhaustion policies for patented, copyrighted and 
6 
trademarked goods can vary to satisfy domestic needs within the same country. 
Although it is commonly believed that there are no easy solutions for IPR policy 
given theoretical and empirical ambiguity, this dissertation tries to shed some lights 
on the effect of IPR reform in open economies for specific markets and is expected to 
provide helpful information to policymakers.  
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CHAPTER II 
PARALLEL IMPORTS, SERVICE AND INVESTMENT 
INCENTIVES 
 
1. Introduction 
The exhaustion doctrine related to intellectual property rights (IPRs) defines the 
territorial rights of IPR holders after the first sale of their protected products. It simply 
states that the IPR holder may no longer control distribution of a protected good.  
There are three kinds of exhaustion regimes: national exhaustion, international 
exhaustion and regional exhaustion. Current exhaustion regimes differ widely among 
countries. Under a system of national exhaustion, once the IPR holder sells its 
protected product within a country that adopts national exhaustion, this IPR holder 
can no longer control its distribution. i.e., the first sale within a country exhausts 
original ownership rights. Similarly, international exhaustion indicates that the first 
sale in any countries exhausts the IPR holder’s exclusive privilege. For example, if 
Australia adopts international exhaustion for music CDs, then anyone can resell a 
music CD in Australia no matter where the first sale occurred. Regional exhaustion 
states that the original ownership rights are exhausted if the first sale occurs anywhere 
within the region. 
Parallel imports (PI, sometimes are called gray market goods) are genuine 
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products imported into a country through unauthorized channels. As stated above, 
under a system of national exhaustion, an IPR holder can prevent parallel imports of 
his or her products from a foreign country. Similarly, parallel imports from any 
foreign countries are allowed in a country that adopts international exhaustion 
doctrine. Under a system of regional exhaustion, parallel imports cannot be prohibited 
only when those protected products are imported from other countries within this 
region. The existence of PI raises a lot of interesting political and strategic issues. 
Since PI occur when arbitrage opportunities exist, PI will affect the price and welfare 
in a country. From the IPR holder’s point of view, parallel imports have effects on his 
or her market power and profits. Therefore, the IPR holder may adopt some strategies 
as responses to PI. 
Generally, parallel imports and authorized goods are treated as homogeneous 
products in most studies. However, it is hard to believe that consumers will consider 
authorized goods and parallel imports as homogenous. There are at least two reasons 
why consumers tend to buy authorized goods if the prices of authorized goods and 
parallel imports are identical: signaling and after-sale services. For signaling, 
consumers will expect that products sold by the franchised distributor must be 
genuine. The effect of signaling is significant for famous-brand bags or clothes such 
as Coach, Prada and so on. These products are typically durable goods; therefore 
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warranties are less important for these products. For services, consumers will expect 
that buying authorized goods can enjoy better services. 
In this study, I am going to focus on the effect of services. Treating PI as 
homogeneous goods does not consider one possible strategy that firms may employ to 
alleviate the degree of competition: firms can offer services to achieve product 
differentiation. In addition, people may argue that the existence of parallel imports 
will reduce the authorized distributor’s market development investment in PI recipient 
country. However, they do not consider another investment that will not be free ridden 
by PI – investment in service. In practice, authorized goods and parallel imports can 
be distinguished by a sticker or by the product series number and therefore, authorized 
distributors will offer service for authorized products only. Thus, to discuss PI’s 
impact on investment, we should separate the investment into brand marketing and 
service marketing, where the former can be free ridden by parallel imports but the 
latter cannot.  
A simple Bertrand competition game is developed and some numerical examples 
are given to show the ideas of this chapter. The main results of this chapter are as 
follows. First, in equilibrium, the IPR holder will bundle its product and service and 
the parallel importer will offer the product only. Thus the price of PI is lower than the 
price of authorized goods. Second, the authorized distributors may respond to PI by 
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investing more in service. The intuition behind these results is that authorized 
distributors can alleviate price competition by offering service and investing more in 
service, because this strategy can make authorized products and parallel imports more 
differentiated.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Some relevant literatures are reviewed in 
section 2. The model of firms’ decision making is developed in section 3. Section 4 
analyzes the equilibrium. Section 5 extends the basic model to discuss investment in 
PI recipient country. Conclusions presented in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, I will summarize some economic studies that discuss parallel imports. 
Those studies can be categorized by three kinds of theoretical settings: (1) retail 
arbitrage (or horizontal parallel trade) due to price discrimination, (2) vertical price 
control model and (3) free-rider problem. I will not discuss the third category in detail 
but give some intuitions behind this argument. Studies in the third category argue that 
parallel imports will undermine the incentive of a franchised distributor to invest in 
market development because PI will free ride on the investments made by official 
distributor. 
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2.1 Price Discrimination and Retail Arbitrage 
Intellectual property rights give the title holders market power. Firms with market 
power have an incentive to charge consumers different prices. In section 2.1, I will 
review some studies that build models based on retail arbitrage due to price 
discrimination. In these papers, parallel importation occurs because of differences 
between retail prices. 
 
2.1.1 Third-Degree Price discrimination 
In third-degree price discrimination, price varies by location or by consumer 
segment. With internationally segmented markets, firms may charge different prices 
in different countries. The inverse-elasticity rule claims that optimal pricing implies 
that the monopolist should charge more in markets with the lower elasticity of 
demand (Tirole 1988). Permitting PI will limit the scope for international price 
discrimination. 
The welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination is ambiguous. Fink (2004) 
provides a simple example. Suppose there are one rich country and one poor country. 
Permitting PI may reduce the deadweight loss in the rich country because of a lower 
price and a higher quantity. On the other hand, if PI are allowed between these two 
countries and the firm is forced to charge a uniform price, then it is possible that only 
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the rich country will be served. Therefore, permitting PI has two offsetting effects on 
welfare. The positive effect comes from the limitation of market power; the negative 
effect may arise in the absence of markets in some countries. This argument indicates 
that substantial differences in valuation and price elasticity of demand increase the 
risk that permitting PI leaves some markets unserved. 
Malueg and Schwartz (1994) consider a monopolist with zero marginal cost. The 
monopolist faces a continuum market and linear demands. Each market can be viewed 
as a country. They compare the global welfare in uniform pricing, price discrimination 
and a mixed regime where prices are different between regions but are identical 
within the region. They find that uniform pricing by a monopolist could yield lower 
global welfare than third-degree discriminatory pricing if demand dispersion across 
markets is sufficiently large. The intuition is that though uniform pricing avoids 
output misallocation, too many markets go unserved. Moreover, they also show that 
the global welfare can be maximized under a system of regional exhaustion, i.e. price 
discrimination is allowed between groups but is not allowed within the group. This is 
not surprising because in a mixed system, markets with similar demands are grouped 
together. The misallocation due to price differences can be reduced to some extent, 
while all markets are still served. 
However, we should note that in Malueg and Schwartz (1994), regional 
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exhaustion is socially optimal in global terms. This does not imply that national 
welfare is also maximized. Consumers in countries with a lower price under 
international price discrimination then under uniform pricing will prefer regulations 
on PI; while consumers in countries with a high price under international price 
discrimination than under uniform pricing will be better off if parallel importation is 
allowed. 
Richardson (2002) argues that in recent years many small countries have 
liberalized parallel imports. This runs counter to the prediction stated above. To 
explain this finding, Richardson (2002) develops a simple price discrimination model 
where countries choose their parallel importing regime simultaneously and 
non-cooperatively, a global Nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel 
importing into all relevant foreign markets i.e. global uniform pricing. 
 
2.1.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination 
In second-degree price discrimination, price varies depending on quantity sold. 
Firms will provide incentives for the consumers to differentiate themselves according 
to preference. Given arbitrage costs, consumers in the high-price market can choose 
which market to buy in, and thus there is self-selection among them. Therefore, firms 
can choose prices to split consumers endogenously. In this section, I will review some 
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studies where arbitrage could be good for firms with market power. Anderson and 
Ginsburg (1999) develop a model with two countries and heterogeneous consumers, 
who are different in willingness to pay and arbitrage costs. They show that a firm has 
an incentive to open a new market in another country even if there is no local demand 
there. The reason for doing so is that by opening a new market, the firm can price 
discriminate between consumers at domestic country. The intuition can be explained 
by a simple example. Suppose that country 1 has two types of consumers. Type 1 
consumers have high valuation for the product and also have a prohibitive arbitrage 
cost. Type 2 consumers have low valuation for the product and have a low arbitrage 
cost. Assume that there is no local demand in the country 2. Without opening a new 
market in country 2, the firm will charge a price equal to type 2 consumers’ marginal 
benefit. However, given the spirit of second-degree price discrimination, the firm can 
benefit if it can distinguish between these two types of consumers. This can be done 
by opening a new market in country 2. The firm can take the arbitrage cost into 
account and then charge a higher price in country 1 and a lower price in country 2 so 
that both groups of consumers will purchase. It is straightforward that the firm’s profit 
will increase as type 2 consumers’ arbitrage cost decreases because the firm can 
increase the price in country 2 and thus the profit will increase. Thus, in Anderson and 
Ginsburg’s model, firms with market power can benefit from arbitrage. 
15 
Raff and Schmitt (2007) also provide a model with uncertain demand to 
demonstrate that the manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade. Moreover, they 
also show that parallel trade is welfare improving. Their results are based on four 
conditions. First, retailers must place orders before the state of demand is known. 
Second, at the end of the demand period, it is costly to maintain them as inventories. 
Third, the states of demand must be different across markets. Finally, different states 
of demand affect the quantity demanded rather than consumer’s willingness to pay for 
the products. The intuition behind their results is that parallel trade gives retailers an 
incentive to place larger orders than they otherwise would. 
 
2.2 Vertical Price Control 
In section 2.1, arbitrage is based on differences in retail prices. However, 
evidences show that it is common to see parallel trade from countries with high retail 
prices to countries with low retail prices. Therefore, the retail or horizontal arbitrage 
models seem insufficient to explain this phenomenon. Evidences also show that in 
many products PI exist at the wholesale level. In this section, I will review some 
studies that focus on wholesale level arbitrage. 
Maskus and Chen (2002) develop a theory of parallel imports and vertical price 
control. They consider a manufacturer selling its protected product in two countries, A 
16 
and B. The manufacture sells directly to consumers in country A, where the 
manufacturer locates, but sells its products in country B through a franchised 
distributor. The manufacturer can’t prevent the distributor from selling its product in 
country A as PI; however, if the distributor does so, it incurs a positive trade cost.  
The manufacturer charges the distributor by two part tariff and thus the distributor’s 
economic profits will be fully extracted. With linear demands in both countries (vary 
only by an intercept term), they show that the manufacturer can limit such parallel 
imports by raising wholesale prices, but this reduces vertical pricing efficiency. 
Parallel imports can thus occur in equilibrium. In this model, they provide a consistent 
explanation for two empirical facts. First, parallel imports are procured at the 
wholesale level. Second, their model can explain the fact that parallel trade from high 
retail price countries to low retail price countries. 
Maskus and Chen (2004) and Chen and Maskus (2005) use a similar framework. 
In a 2-country and one-way PI model, they assume that the manufacturer sells 
products through two distributors A and B. A is the franchised distributor in country 1 
and B is the franchised distributor in country 2. The manufacturer charges the 
distributors by two part tariff. In this framework, three tradeoffs arise. First, with PI, 
there is a pro-competitive effect in the PI-recipient market. Second, if the 
manufacturer tries to limit or deter PI by raising the wholesale price in the export 
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market, it will cause double-markup problem there. Third, the trade cost, which is a 
waste in resources, will reduce the manufacturer’s profit. Therefore, in this framework, 
the manufacturer has two instruments, two wholesale prices, to balance three effects 
stated above. 
Their conclusions can be summarized as follows. First, starting from zero trade 
costs, an increase in trade cost reduces parallel imports. At the same time, the 
manufacturer will charge a higher wholesale price in the export market. If the trade 
costs are low enough, by raising the wholesale price in the export market, the 
pro-competitive effect plus the trade cost effect would dominate the double-markup 
effect. As trade costs rise toward the prohibitive level so that markets are segmented, 
the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale price toward the efficient vertical level in 
the export market to avoid double-markup problem. This implies that the wholesale 
price curve is an inverted-V shape in underlying trade costs. Second, they find that the 
manufacturer’s profit is U-shape in trade costs. The profit falls with an initial increase 
in trade cost because as trade cost rises from zero, even though the volume of PI 
decreases, the cost of PI will increase from zero. In addition to this effect, the 
double-markup effect caused by an increase in the wholesale price in the export 
market will also reduce the manufacturer’s profit. As the trade cost achieves 
prohibitive level, the effect of waste in trade cost becomes less important; therefore, it 
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can reduce the wholesale prices to avoid the double-markup problem. Thus, as PI are 
deterred, profits start to rise until they achieve their maximum when markets are fully 
segmented. 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2007) also use this framework and work carefully 
through the first-order conditions that capture the pro-competitive effect, the existence 
of trade costs and the double-markup effect. They obtain a counterintuitive result: In 
some circumstances it may be misleading to think that permitting PI is an 
unambiguous force for price integration: for low trade costs, retail prices could 
diverge as a result of declining trading costs, even as the volume of PI increases. The 
intuition behind this result is that with low trade costs, the manufacturer can set a high 
wholesale price in the recipient market to avoid the pro-competitive effect. At the 
same time, it can charge a low wholesale price in the export market to avoid the 
double-markup problem as long as the trade cost is sufficiently low. 
 
2.3 Parallel Imports and Product Differentiation 
Papers that consider PI and product differentiation are very limited. Ahmadi and 
Yang (2000), Cosac (2003) and Ganslandt and Maskus (2007) assume that the quality 
of PI is exogenously a fraction of the quality of authorized goods. Ahmadi and Yang 
(2000) show that parallel imports may actually increase the monopolist’s profits. The 
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intuition behind this is that parallel importation becomes another channel for the 
authentic goods and creates a new product version that allows the manufacturer to 
price discriminate. Cosac (2003) develops a vertical price control model and assumes 
that consumers consider the authorized good to be of higher quality than the parallel 
imports, and shows that it is often in the interest of the manufacturer to encourage the 
availability of parallel imported goods. 
However, their models do not answer why the parallel imports must be inferior 
to the authorized goods. In this chapter, as mentioned in introduction, I am going to 
provide an economic rationale by developing a simple horizontal parallel trade model 
to show that even if the parallel imports and the authorized goods are identical in 
products, the IPR holder can alleviate price competition by bundling the product and 
service and thus the price of authorized goods (a bundle of product and service) is 
higher than the price of PI. 
 
2.4 Bundling 
The concept of bundling two different markets has been studied with different 
assumptions. Chen (1997) assumes that the first market has duopoly and the second 
market has perfect competition. He shows that bundling enables competing firms to 
differentiate their products and alleviate price competition. He also shows that pure 
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bundling weakly dominates mixed bundling; however this result builds on the 
assumption that both firms have identical marginal cost. The assumption of symmetry 
in cost might be inapplicable to PI study. Horn and Shy (1996) and Kameshwaran, 
Viswanadham and Vijay Desai (2007) consider the problem of product-service 
bundling and pricing. In a symmetric duopoly market, where consumers have 
identical preference for the product and heterogeneous willingness to pay for the 
service, they show that in equilibrium, one firm will bundle the product and service 
while the other will sell the product only. However, Horn and Shy do not consider the 
case where service is provided separately. To have a complete analysis, we discuss the 
case where the firm has three strategies: offering the product only, selling the product 
and service separately and bundling the product and service. This setting is similar to 
Kameshwaran, Viswanadham and Vijay Desai (2007) but we extend the idea to a 
retail arbitrage PI model with asymmetric firms, which is not considered in 
Kameshwaran, Viswanadham and Vijay Desai (2007). 
 
3. The Model 
3.1 The Background 
Let’s consider one small open economy (A) and the rest of the world (ROW). 
The manufacturer (M) sells its products in both A and ROW. If PI is prohibited in 
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country A, M will be the monopolist in this country. If country A allows PI, then there 
could be a trader shipping the products from ROW to A as parallel imports. Providing 
services is an open strategy for the manufacturer and the parallel importer. However, 
we assume that the service provided by a firm can only be utilized for the product sold 
by the same firm. This setup can capture the common parallel trade pattern between 
Taiwan and Japan. In recent years, many products (such as air conditioners, 
automobiles, electronics, etc.) are parallel imported from Japan to Taiwan. For 
example, in February 2008, consumers in Taiwan can buy Nikon Coolpix P5100 (a 
digital camera) either from authorized channels or from parallel traders. According to 
Taiwan Yahoo, the price of authorized good is around USD $430 and the price of PI is 
around USD $310. However, buying authorized goods will have 18 months warranties 
by Nikon in Taiwan, but buying PI will not. In other words, the franchised distributors 
offer services only to consumers who buy the authorized product. That is, Nikon in 
Taiwan will not provide any service for PI. 
 
3.2 The Manufacturer and the Parallel Importer 
We assume that the manufacturer has a constant marginal cost of production CP. 
We assume horizontal parallel trade; therefore, the parallel importer’s cost of 
providing a product is equal to the retail price in ROW ሺpRሻ plus international 
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shipping cost. To earn nonnegative profit in ROW, we must have pR ൒ CP. For both 
manufacturer and parallel importer, the cost of providing service is CS. Both firms 
(manufacturer and parallel importer) face the following Stackelberg pricing game. In 
stage 1, the parallel importer will decide whether or not to enter country A. If it enters, 
in stage 2, the manufacturer picks up one strategy from the set (G, G+S, GS). After 
observing manufacturer’s decision, the parallel importer chooses one strategy from (G, 
G+S, GS) as well. Strategy G indicates offering goods only. G+S is a strategy that 
offers goods and services separately. GS means bundling goods and services. Let P୨୧ 
(j=G, G+S, GS; i=M, PI) be the price charged by firm i with strategy j in country A. 
(If the strategy is G+S, then there will be prices PG and PS denoting the price of the 
good and the price of service respectively.) After determining the strategy in stage 2, 
as Ahmadi and Yang (2000), firms set their prices in the manner of Stackelberg price 
competition in stage 3. That is the parallel trader sets its price after observing M’s 
pricing decision.  
 
3.3 The Consumers 
In both countries, we assume a continuum of consumers with total measure one. 
This model assumes that consumers in country A have heterogeneous preference for 
the product and service with valuation γ and δ respectively. γ is a random variable that 
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is uniformly distributed on the support [0,γത]. Similarly, δ is also a random variable 
that is uniformly distributed on the support [0,ߜҧ]. We assume that people with high 
valuation for the product will also have higher willingness to pay for the service. The 
demand for the product and the bundle of product and service can be represented by 
the following functions.  
P ൌ γത ൅ δത െ ൫γത ൅ δത൯Q                if service is provided 
P ൌ γത െ γതQ                            if service is not provided 
Let the price of service be PS. A consumer is assumed to choose the offering that 
maximizes his/her payoff. In country A, consumer’s payoff is shown in table 2.1.  
 
Offering Buying from M Buying from PI 
G γ െ PGM γ െ PGPI 
G+S γ ൅ δ െ PGM െ PSM γ ൅ δ െ PGPI െ PSPI 
GS γ ൅ δ െ PGSM  γ ൅ δ െ PGSPI 
Table 2.1  Consumer’s payoff in country A 
 
3.4 The Game Structure 
This is a three stage non-cooperative game: 
Stage 1: Entering 
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The parallel importer decides whether or not to enter the market in country A. If 
not, the manufacturer will be the monopolist in both countries. If the parallel importer 
enters, then this game will move to stage 2. 
 
Stage 2: Offering 
In stage 2, after observing the parallel importer’s entry, the manufacturer will 
choose one strategy in country A from G, G+S and GS. After manufacturer’s move, 
the parallel importer will then pick up one strategy from the strategy set (G,G+S,GS). 
Once the choice is made, neither can change the offering. Therefore, there will be nine 
possible outcomes in this stage. 
 
Stage 3: Pricing 
Given the strategy in stage 2, both firms set the price for their respective offering 
in a manner of Stackelberg leader-follower pricing game. For the firms to get 
non-negative profits and for the consumers to get non-negative payoffs, the prices in 
country A should satisfy the following constraints: 
(1) CP ൅ t ൑ PGM ൑ γത  
(2) pR ൅ t ൑ PGPI ൑ γത 
(3) CS ൑ PS୧ ൑ δത    i= M, PI 
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(4) CP ൅ CS ൅ t ൑ PGSM ൑ γത ൅ δത      
(5) pR ൅ CS ൅ t ൑ PGSPI ൑ γത ൅ δത 
(6) δത is sufficiently large. This condition captures the assumption that the upper 
bound of consumers’ valuation for service is high enough and thus the profit in 
offering service could be significant. 
(7) γത ൒ pR ൅ t  If not, no international trade occurs. 
In addition to above constraints, we will make one more crucial assumption: the gap 
between the retail price in ROW and the manufacturer’s production cost is not too 
high. That is, pR െ CP is sufficiently small. This assumption is related the cost 
structures of the two competing firms in country A. If the gap is too high, PI will 
never occur, which is not an interesting case. Thus, we make such an assumption in 
the following analysis. 
 
4. Solving the Model 
The equilibrium in this chapter is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). 
Backward induction is employed in solving this game. To solve the equilibrium in 
country A, we will first solve the pricing game in 9 subgames and obtain the payoffs 
in those 9 subgames. Given the payoffs, firms can pick up the strategy that maximizes 
its payoff. Once the SPNE in stage 2 and stage 3 is obtained, the parallel importer will 
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make his decision on entering and thus the Nash equilibrium of the whole game is 
solved.  
 
4.1 Solving the Pricing Game in Country A 
Let Γሺσଵ, σଶሻ be the subgame that the manufacturer chooses σ1 and the parallel 
importer chooses σ2 in stage 2. There are nine subgames that should be analyzed.  
 
(1) ΓሺG, Gሻ  
The parallel importer’s marginal cost of providing the product is pR ൅ t, where t is the 
international shipping cost. Similarly, the manufacturer’s marginal cost of providing 
the product is CP ൅ t. Since CP ൏ pR, in a price competition game, the price of the 
product will be pR ൅ t െ Ԗ, where Ԗ ൐ 0 represents the smallest currency unit. The 
parallel importer will earn zero profit. Since consumers with γ ൐ pR ൅ t െ Ԗ will buy 
the product from M, the manufacturer’s profit isሺpR െ CPሻሺ1 െ ሺ୮Rା୲ሻஓഥ ሻ assuming that 
Ԗ ՜ 0ା.1 
 
(2) ΓሺG ൅ S, G ൅ Sሻ 
If both firms offer G+S in country A, Bertrand competition in product market implies 
                                                      
1 We will impose this assumption for the following analysis. 
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that PGPIሺG ൅ S, G ൅ Sሻ ൌ pR ൅ t  and  PGMሺG ൅ S, G ൅ Sሻ ൌ pR ൅ t െ Ԗ . 
Similarly, PSM ൌ PSPI ൌ CS. Therefore, the parallel importer’s profit is zero and the 
manufacturer’s profit isሺpR െ CPሻ ቀ1 െ ୮Rା୲ஓഥ ቁ. 
 
(3) ΓሺGS, GSሻ 
In this subgame, price competition leads to the following pricing 
result:  PGSPIሺGS, GSሻ ൌ pR ൅ t ൅ CS , PGSM ሺGS, GSሻ ൌ pR ൅ t െ Ԗ ൅ CS . Therefore, the 
profit of the parallel importer and the manufacturer will be 0 and 
ሺpR െ CPሻ ቀ1 െ ୮RାCSା୲ஓഥାஔഥ ቁ respectively. 
 
(4) ΓሺG ൅ S, Gሻ 
In this subgame, the parallel importer will earn zero profit. The manufacturer sells the 
product at  PGM ൌ pR ൅ t െ Ԗ and charges a price for service PSM to maximize  
πGାSM ሺG ൅ S, Gሻ ൌ ሺpR െ CPሻሺ1 െ ୮Rା୲ஓഥ ሻ ൅ ൫PSM െ CS൯ ቀ
ஔഥିPSM
ஔഥ ቁ                               ሺ2.1ሻ  
We can easily verify that the optimal service price charged by the manufacturer is 
PSMሺG ൅ S, Gሻ ൌ ஔഥାCSଶ  and the manufacturer’s profit is  
πGାSM ሺG ൅ S, Gሻ ൌ ሺpR െ CPሻሺ1 െ ୮Rା୲ஓഥ ሻ ൅
ଵ
ஔഥ ቀ
ஔഥିCS
ଶ ቁ
ଶ                                                 ሺ2.2ሻ  
 
(5) ΓሺGS, Gሻ 
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The idea of deriving the quantity demanded for M and PI is shown in figure 2.1. In 
this subgame, the quantity demanded for M can be obtained by solving the following 
equation for Q: 
γത ൅ δത െ ൫γത ൅ δത൯Q െ PGSM ൌ γത െ γതQ െ PGPI                                                                  ሺ2.3ሻ 
The left hand side of (2.3) is the marginal consumer surplus of buying the bundle 
from M and the right hand side of (2.3) is the marginal consumer surplus of buying 
the product from PI. Therefore, the quantity demanded for M isQGSM ൌ PG
PIିPGSM ାஔഥ
ஔഥ .  
Similarly, the quantity demanded for PI is QGPI ൌ ஓഥିPG
PI
ஓഥ െ
PGPIିPGSM ାஔഥ
ஔഥ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: demand curves for the bundle and the product  
P 
δത ൅ γത  Demand for the Bundle 
γത 
PGSM  
Demand for the Product 
PGPI 
Q 
QGSM   Qഥ  1 
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Therefore, the parallel importer will face the following optimization problem: 
max
PGPI
πGPIሺGS, Gሻ ൌ ൫PGPI െ pR െ t൯ ቆγത െ PG
PI
γത െ
PGPI െ PGSM ൅ δത
δത ቇ                              ሺ2.4ሻ  
While the manufacturer is solving the following optimization problem: 
max
PGSM
πGSM ሺGS, Gሻ ൌ ൫PGSM െ CP െ t െ CS൯ሺδ
ത െ PGSM ൅ PGPI
δത ሻ                                         ሺ2.5ሻ 
To solve a Stackelberg pricing game by backward induction, we should solve the 
optimal PGPI first. It is easy to verify that  
PGPIሺGS, Gሻ ൌ PGS
M γത ൅ ൫δത ൅ γത൯ሺpR ൅ tሻ
2൫γത ൅ δത൯                                                                           ሺ2.6ሻ 
Substituting (2.6) into (2.5), and find the FOC for PGSM , we can obtain 
PGSM ሺGS, Gሻ ൌ CP൫2δ
ത ൅ γത൯ ൅ γതሺpR ൅ CS ൅ 2tሻ ൅ δത൫2δത ൅ pR ൅ 2CS ൅ 3t൯
2൫2δത ൅ γത൯             ሺ2.7ሻ 
And thus the profits of these two firms in country A are 
πGPIሺGS, Gሻ
ൌ ൫γത
ଶሺCP ൅ CS െ pRሻ െ 4δതଶሺpR ൅ tሻ ൅ δതγതሺ2൫CP ൅ CS ൅ δത ൅ γത൯ െ 3t െ 5pRሻ൯ଶ
16δതγത൫δത ൅ γത൯൫2δത ൅ γത൯ଶ ሺ2.8ሻ 
and  
πGSM ሺGS, Gሻ
ൌ ቀ2δ
തଶ െ CP൫2δത ൅ γത൯ െ γതሺCS െ pRሻ ൅ δതሺpR ൅ 2γത െ 2CS െ tሻቁ
ଶ
8δത൫δത ൅ γത൯൫2δത ൅ γത൯                             ሺ2.9ሻ 
 
(6) ΓሺGS, G ൅ Sሻ 
Price competition implies that PGSM ൌ PGPI ൅ PSPI െ Ԗ ൌ pR ൅ t ൅ CS െ Ԗ . In this 
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subgame, there exists some demand for the product from PI. In other words, PI can 
choose PGPI to maximize its profit. The quantity demanded for M and PI can be 
derived by the same method in subgame (5). Therefore, the parallel trader will face 
the following optimization problem: 
max
PSPI
πGାSPI ൌ ൫PGPI െ pR െ t൯ ቆγത െ PG
PI
γത െ
PGPI െ PGSM ൅ δത
δത ቇ      
 s. t.    PGSM ൌ pR ൅ t ൅ CS െ Ԗ         
We can easily verify that  PGPI ൌ ஔഥሺ୮Rା୲ሻାஓഥሺଶ୮RାCSାଶ୲ሻଶሺஔഥାஓഥሻ , πGାSPI ൌ
൫ஓഥCSିஔഥሺ୮Rା୲ሻ൯మ
ସஔഥஓഥሺஔഥାஓഥሻ  and 
πGSM ൌ ሺ୮RିCPሻሺଶஔഥ
మିஓഥCSାஔഥሺଶஓഥି୮RିଶCSି୲ሻሻ
ଶሺஔഥାஓഥሻ  
 
(7) ΓሺG ൅ S, GSሻ 
In this subgame, price competition will lead the manufacturer to choose PGM and PSM 
such that PGM ൅ PSM ൏ PGSPI. In other words, the parallel importer will earn zero profit in 
this subgame. However, the manufacturer can choose an optimal PGM to maximize 
profit. From the consumer’s payoff matrix, we know some consumers will buy both 
product and service form M and some consumers will only buy the product from M. 
Thus, the manufacturer will face the following profit maximization problem: 
max
PGM
πGାSM ሺG ൅ S, GSሻ
ൌ ൫PGM െ CP െ t൯ ቆ൫pR ൅ t ൅ CS െ PG
M൯
δത െ
PGM
γത ቇ
൅ ሺpR ൅ t െ CPሻ ቆδ
ത െ pR െ t െ CS ൅ PGM
δത ቇ                                    ሺ2.10ሻ  
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From the FOC of (2.10), we can easily obtain the optimal price of product PGMሺG ൅
S, GSሻ ൌ CPஔഥାଶ୮RஓഥାஓഥCSାஔഥ୲ାଷஓഥ୲ଶሺஔഥାஓഥሻ  and thus, the optimal price of service is  PSMሺG ൅
S, GSሻ ൌ pR ൅ t ൅ CS െ CPஔഥାଶ୮RஓഥାஓഥCSାஔഥ୲ାଷஓഥ୲ଶሺஔഥାஓഥሻ . 
The manufacturer’s profit can be obtained by substituting the optimal prices in the 
profit function. That is πGାSM ሺG ൅ S, GSሻ ൌ  ൫CPଶδതଶ ൅ γതଶሺCS െ tሻଶ െ 2δതγതሺ2pRሺpR െ
γത ൅ CSሻ ൅ 4pR െ 2γത ൅ 3CSሻt ൅ tଶሻ ൅ δതଶ൫4pRγത ൅ tሺ4γത ൅ tሻ൯ ൅ 2cPδതሺδതሺെ2γത ൅ tሻ ൅
γതሺ2pR െ 2γത ൅ CS ൅ 3tሻሻሻ/ሺ4δതγതሺδത ൅ γതሻሻ                                                              
 
(8) ΓሺG, GSሻ 
The idea of solving the NE in this subgame is identical to ΓሺGS, Gሻ. In ΓሺG, GSሻ, the 
manufacturer will face the following profit maximization problem: 
max
PGM
πGMሺG, GSሻ ൌ ൫PGM െ CP െ t൯ሺγത െ PG
M
γത െ
δത ൅ PGM െ PGSPI
δത ሻ                               ሺ2.11ሻ 
Similarly, the parallel importer will face the following maximization problem: 
max
PGSPI
πGSPI ሺG, GSሻ ൌ ൫PGSPI െ pR െ t െ CS൯ ቆδ
ത െ PGSPI ൅ PGM
δത ቇ                                     ሺ2.12ሻ 
A Stackelberg pricing game leads us to the following optimal prices in this subgame: 
PGSPIሺG, GSሻ ൌ 12 ൫δത ൅ pR ൅ PG
M ൅ CS ൅ t൯                                                                   ሺ2.13ሻ 
PGMሺG, GSሻ ൌ 14δത ൫2CPδത െ γത ൅ 2δതγത ൅ 2δതt൯                                                                ሺ2.14ሻ 
By substituting (2.14) into (2.13), (2.11) and (2.12), we can obtain both firms’ profit 
in this subgame:  
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πGSPI ሺG, GSሻ
ൌ ൫െ4δത
ଶ െ CPሺ2δ ൅ γതሻ ൅ γതሺpR ൅ CSሻ ൅ δതሺ4p୰ െ 3γത ൅ 4CS ൅ 2tሻ൯ଶ
16δ൫2δത ൅ γത൯ଶ               ሺ2.15ሻ 
πGMሺG, GSሻ ൌ ൫CP൫2δ
ത ൅ γത൯ െ γത൫δത ൅ pR ൅ CS൯ ൅ 2δതt൯ଶ
8δതγതሺ2δത ൅ γതሻ                                           ሺ2.16ሻ   
 
(9) ΓሺG, G ൅ Sሻ 
In this subgame, no consumers will buy product without buying service from PI since 
price competition will make the payoff of buying product from PI strictly less than the 
payoff of buying product from the manufacturer. Thus, a consumer will choose to buy 
G+S from PI or G from M. Price competition will lead PGMሺG, G ൅ Sሻ ൌ pR ൅ t െ Ԗ. 
Consumers with γ ൅ δ െ PSPI െ PGM ൒ γ െ PGM will buy G+S from PI. Therefore, the 
parallel importer will face the following profit maximization problem: 
max
PSPI
πGାSPI ሺG, G ൅ Sሻ ൌ ൫PSPI െ CS൯ ቆδ
ത െ PSPI
δത ቇ                                                         ሺ2.17ሻ 
PSPIሺG, G ൅ Sሻ ൌ 12 ൫δത ൅ CS ൯                                                                                          ሺ2.18ሻ 
πGMሺG, G ൅ Sሻ ൌ ሺpR െ CPሻሺδ
ത ൅ CS
2δത െ
pR ൅ t
γത ሻ                                                          ሺ2.19ሻ 
πGାSPI ሺG, G ൅ Sሻ ൌ 1δത ቆ
δത െ CS
2 ቇ
ଶ
                                                                                   ሺ2.20ሻ 
Since the payoff is hard to compare directly, we assign some values for the parameters 
to make the payoff comparable. The result in table 2.2 is obtained by assigning 
൫δത, γത, pR, t, CP, CS൯ ൌ ሺ1, 2, 1, 0.05, 0.9, 0.5ሻ. 
By comparing the payoffs (see table 2.2), we can conclude that (GS,G) is the SPNE. 
33 
That is, the manufacturer will bundle the product and the service while the parallel 
importer will sell the product only. In the NE, the price of authorized good (a bundle 
of product and service) is higher than the price of parallel imports. 
 
 PI 
M 
 G G+S GS 
G 
0.0475 (M) 
0 (PI) 
0.0225 
0.0625 
0.0264 
0.0791 
G+S 
0.11 
0 
0.0475 
0 
0.0726 
0 
GS 
0.1169 
0.01438 
0.049 
0.0001 
0.04833 
0 
Table 2.2: Firms’ Payoff Matrix in Country A.  (૓ ՜ ૙ା) 
 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the graph of πGାSM ሺG ൅ S, Gሻ and πGSM ሺGS, Gሻ given the 
value we assigned (except CP) . The horizontal axis is pR െ CP, where pR ൌ 1. It is 
clear that when pR െ CP  is sufficiently small, πGSM ሺGS, Gሻ ൐ πGାSM ሺG ൅ S, Gሻ  and 
thus, (GS,G) is the SPNE. 
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4.2 Solving the Entry Game 
It is clear that the parallel importer will enter the market in country A because the 
parallel importer’s payoff after entry is 
 πGPIሺGS, Gሻ ൌ ൫ஓഥ
మሺCPାCSି୮Rሻିସஔഥమሺ୮Rା୲ሻାஔഥஓഥሺଶ൫CPାCSାஔഥାஓഥ൯ିଷ୲ିହ୮Rሻ൯మ
ଵ଺ஔഥஓഥ൫ஔഥାஓഥ൯൫ଶஔഥାஓഥ൯మ ൐ 0,  
while the payoff of not entering is zero. Thus, in equilibrium, if PI can’t be deterred, 
the manufacturer will sell the product and the service as a bundle and the parallel 
importer will sell the product only. The intuition behind this result is that in a Bertrand 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 2.2: profit for different offering strategies 
Profit 
Manufacturer’s profit when 
offering a bundle of good and 
service 
pR െ CP 
Manufacturer’s profit 
when goods and service 
are offered separately 
Note:  pR  is the world price of the good;  CP  is a constant marginal cost of 
production.  pR െ CP  reflects the cost gap between the manufacturer and 
parallel importer. 
πGSM ሺGS, Gሻ 
πGାSM ሺG ൅ S, Gሻ
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competition game, firms have incentives to differentiate their products because the 
more similar the offers are, the lower profits firms can earn. 
 
5. Parallel Imports and Investment  
In this section, based on the result in section 4, we will discuss the impact of PI 
on authorized distributors’ investment incentive. Given certain assumptions, we know 
in equilibrium, the authorized distributor will offer product and service as a bundle, 
while the parallel importer will sell the product only. In this section, we will consider 
the case that the demand can be affected by authorized distributor’s market 
development investment. Here, the market development investment is separated into 
investment in brand marketing and investment in service marketing. The key 
difference between them is that the parallel importer can free ride authorized 
distributor’s effort in brand marketing, while the investment in service marketing is 
excludable. An investing stage is added in the very beginning of the game structure. 
That is, the authorized distributor will decide how much to invest in brand marketing 
and service marketing so that the demand functions are determined. And then the 
game will be played as stated in section 4. 
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5.1 Equilibrium Investment when Service Marketing is Considered 
As stated in section 3.3, the demand functions are still 
P ൌ γത ൅ δത െ ൫γത ൅ δത൯Q                if service is provided 
P ൌ γത െ γതQ                            if service is not provided 
However, γത and δത are no longer constant. We will assume that 
γത ൌ γ଴ ൅ α eB 
δത ൌ δ଴ ൅ β eS 
where γ଴, δ଴, α and β are given constants and eB and eS denote the effort in brand 
marketing and service marketing respectively. 
The cost of investment is assumed to be of a quadratic form. The cost of brand 
marketing is ஛ଶ eBଶ  and the cost of service marketing is 
µ
ଶ eSଶ. Similar to section 4, the 
authorized distributor’s profit function can be represented by 
πM ൌ ሺpM െ CP െ t െ CSሻ ቆ1 െ p
M െ pPI
δ଴ ൅ β eSቇ െ
λ
2 eB
ଶ െ µ2 eS
ଶ                                     ሺ2.21ሻ 
The parallel importer’s profit function is 
πPI ൌ ሺpPI െ pR െ tሻ ቆp
M െ pPI
δ଴ ൅ β eS െ
pPI
γ଴ ൅ α eBቇ                                                         ሺ2.22ሻ 
From (2.22), we can easily verify that the optimal price charged by PI is  
pPI ൌ p
Mγ଴ ൅ ሺδ଴ ൅ β eS ൅ γ଴ሻሺpR ൅ tሻ ൅ α eBሺpR ൅ t ൅ pMሻ
2ሺδ଴ ൅ α eB ൅ β eS ൅ γ଴ሻ                             ሺ2.23ሻ 
Substituting (2.23) into (2.21) and deriving the FOC with respect to pM, we can find 
the optimal price charged by authorized distributor: pMሺeB, eSሻ ൌ argmaxሺπMሻ 
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And then substituting pMሺeB, eSሻ and pPIሺeB, eSሻ into (2.21), we can solve for 
optimal effort in brand marketing eBכ  and optimal effort in service marketing eSכ . 
 
5.2 Equilibrium Investment When Service Marketing is Not Considered 
In some studies that PI and authorized products are considered as homogeneous, 
such as Palangkaraya and Yong (2006) argue that the existence of parallel imports will 
reduce the authorized distributor’s market development investment in PI recipient 
country. To compare the optimal investment effort with and without service, we 
should also analyze the case when service is not provided. 
If service is not considered, authorized goods and parallel imports are homogeneous. 
Price competition implies that pM ൌ pR ൅ t െ Ԗ , where Ԗ ՜ 0ା . Therefore, the 
authorized distributor’s profit becomes 
πM ൌ ሺpR െ CPሻ ൬1 െ pR ൅ tγ଴ ൅ α eB൰ െ
λ
2 eB
ଶ                                                                     ሺ2.24ሻ 
Then we may find the optimal effort in brand marketing eB when service is not 
provided. 
 
5.3 A Numerical Example 
I will provide a numerical example to show that even though PI may reduce the 
investment effort in brand marketing, which is non-excludable, the authorized 
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distributor can respond to PI by investing more in service. 
 
Table 2.3 demonstrates the equilibrium investment effort when the parameters are 
assigned in the following way: 
ሺδ଴, γ଴, pR, t, CP, CS, α, β, λ, µሻ ൌ ሺ1, 2, 1, 0.05, 0.9, 0.5, 1, 1, 0.1, 0.1ሻ 
 
 eB eS eB ൅ eS Changes in total 
investment due to PI
No Service, No PI 2.38253 - 2.38253 - 
No Service, With PI 0.214174 - 0.214174 -2.168356 
With Service, No PI 2.41423 2.41423 4.82846 - 
With Service, With PI 0.779818 2.49525 3.275068 -1.553392 
Table 2.3: Profit-maximizing investment in brand marketing and service marketing 
 
Given our simple numerical example, allowing PI will reduce authorized 
distributor’s incentive to invest in brand marketing because of free-rider problem. 
However, if we take service into consideration, authorized distributor will invest more 
in service. In other words, if we ignore service, one may underestimate the investment 
effort when PI are allowed. The intuition behind this result is that by investing more 
in service, authorized goods and parallel imports are more differentiated and thus it 
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can mitigate price competition. 
 The result that the manufacturer can respond to PI by investing more in service is 
robust even when the marginal average cost of service investment (controlled by μ) is 
high. Figure 2.3 depicts the difference in service investment for different value of μ 
(keeping other parameters constant). We can see that changes in investment in service 
are still positive even with higher value of μ.  
 
 
5.4 International Trade Cost 
 In this section, following the parameter setting in 5.3, we will investigate the 
impact of trade cost on manufacturer’s investment. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 show the 
trend of investment in brand marketing and service marketing, respectively, as trade 
cost increases. We can see investment in brand marketing is increasing in trade cost 
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while investment in service marketing goes the other way. Figure 2.6 shows that total 
investment declines as trade cost increases. Since ୢ୮
M
ୢ୲ ൐
ୢ୮PI
ୢ୲ ൐ 02  for any 
nonnegative eB and eS, it means an increase in trade cost increases the price gap 
between the manufacturer and the parallel importer. It indicates that trade cost has 
similar effect as product differentiation in sustaining the price gap. Therefore, when 
we go back to the very beginning of the game structure, we can conclude that 
investment in service is not as attractive as the case with low trade cost. A sensitive 
reader may ask: why the investment in brand marketing increases as trade cost rises? 
Please keep in mind that trade cost is harmful for profits. With an increase in trade 
cost, a firm has an incentive to make effort to shift the demand curve upward. The 
manufacturer has two options to push the demand: brand marketing and service 
marketing. Since the cost of investment is quadratic, investing in brand marketing is 
relatively cheaper given the same level of shifting of demand curve. Therefore, we 
can see investment in brand marketing rises as trade cost increases. Some people 
believe that consumers will be happier if the manufacturer chooses to invest more in 
service rather than in brand. The reason is that although brand advertisement and 
after-sale service both increase ex ante consumer’s willingness to pay, the quality of 
                                                      
2 We can obtain 
dpM
dt ൌ
ଷሺஔబାஒୣSሻାଶሺ஑ୣBାஓబሻ
ସሺஔబାஒୣSሻାଶሺஓబା஑ୣBሻ, 
dpPI
dt ൌ
ସሺஔబାஒୣSሻమାଽሺஔబାஒୣSሻሺஓబା஑ୣBሻାସሺஓబା஑ୣBሻమ
ସሺሺஔబାஒୣSሻାሺஓబା஑ୣBሻሻሺଶሺஔబାஒୣSሻାሺஓబା஑ୣBሻሻ and 
ୢሺ୮Mି୮PIሻ
ୢ୲ ൌ
ሺஔబାஒୣSሻ
ସሺஔబାஒୣSሻାሺஓబା஑ୣBሻ ൐ 0 
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service becomes more important to consumers after purchasing the product. From this 
perspective, allowing PI and reducing trade cost can encourage the manufacturer to 
invest more in service and thus ex post consumer’s welfare improves. 
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6. Conclusions  
In this chapter, I develop a simple three stage game to show that under certain 
assumptions, the manufacturer will bundle the product and service to charge a higher 
price than parallel imports whose pricing strategy is selling the product only. I also 
extend this basic model to analyze the authorized distributor’s investment incentive. 
By separating market development investment into brand marketing and service 
marketing, I use a simple numerical example to demonstrate that even though PI may 
reduce the authorized distributor’s incentive to invest in brand marketing, the 
authorized distributor may respond to PI by investing more in service to achieve 
product differentiation. If service is not considered, investment could be 
underestimated in PI analysis. We also find that trade cost has negative effect on 
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service investment since given the same quality difference, trade cost reduces the 
price gap between authorized products and PI, and thus product differentiation is not 
as attractive as the case with low trade cost. 
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CHAPTER III 
OUTLAW INNOVATION, VIDEO GAME PIRACY AND 
PARALLEL IMPORTS 
 
1. Introduction 
Innovations not only can be done by manufacturers but also be realized by users. 
User innovations aim to add more functions that are not originally provided on the 
product or to bypass legal or technical safeguards. In particular, electronic 
manufactures often embed security mechanism in order to prevent users from running 
unauthorized software or illegally obtained content on their platform. For example, 
the region code on a DVD player prevents users from buying parallel imported 
multimedia products. The security mechanism on a game console prevents illegally 
copied game ROMs from being operated on the platform. Similar examples can also 
be found in telecommunication industry. Apple’s iPhone users can only choose AT&T 
in United States because of the mechanism that aims to increase firms’ market power. 
Mollick (2004) is the first paper that analyzes user innovations that deactivate the 
security mechanisms. Extending Mollick’s research, Flowers (2008) introduces the 
concept of outlaw innovation and provides case studies of how communities create 
and distribute outlaw innovations. As defined by Schulz and Wagner (2008), outlaw 
innovations are user modifications of a product to not only gain unauthorized access 
45 
to the product’s system but to also enable the user to use the system more effectively. 
Outlaw innovation is an important issue because it may violate manufacturers’ 
intellectual property rights and will restrict manufacturers’ market power as well as 
pricing behaviors. For example, users of a videogame console can embed a 
modification chip (or modchip), which is a device used to play import discs, backup 
dvd-r/ dvd-rw, or homebrew game ROMs on the game console to play videogames 
without paying any money to game providers by downloading game ROMs from the 
internet.  
This paper is motivated by the fact that Sony has decided to make its new 
generation game console, Playstation 3 (PS3), a region-free game console.3 In other 
words, PS3 users can play international version games on the PS3 platform if the 
hardware is region-free. A Japanese PS3 hardware owner can run a USA version game 
on the Japanese hardware. Similar strategies are also adopted by Microsoft Xbox 360. 
As we know, the modification chips encourage video game piracy and parallel 
imports (PI). When video game piracy is mentioned, most people expect that the 
modification chips will boost sales of game consoles and will reduce the game 
providers’ profit. However, in this paper, we show the latter is not necessarily true. In 
addition to illegal copy of the software, the modification chips can also undermine 
                                                      
3 See “regional lockout” on Wikipedia:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_lockout 
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manufacturers’ international third degree price discrimination by inspiring parallel 
trade. However, our model shows that it is premature to claim that the hardware 
manufacturer will suffer from parallel imports. Why did Sony and Microsoft change 
their mind to encourage parallel imports? Different model specifications have 
different explanations. In the literature of PI, studies can be roughly categorized as 
vertical price control model and horizontal retail price arbitrage model. The vertical 
price control model of PI, which is first developed by Maskus and Chen (2002, 2004) 
and Chen and Maskus (2005), assumes that a manufacturer protected by IPR in two 
markets has an independent distributor in each location. The manufacturer offers the 
distributors two-part tariff contracts that specify the wholesale prices and a lump-sum 
fee in order to induce profit-maximizing retail prices. In the framework of vertical 
price control model, Ganslandt and Maskus (2007) develop a model to show that the 
manufacturer will prefer to serve a country by PI when trade cost is sufficiently low. 
The idea behind their result is that the manufacturer would push the distributor in the 
PI recipient country out of the market in order to avoid pro-competitive effect when 
trade cost is small.  
The other framework, horizontal retail price arbitrage model, assumes that PI 
occurs simply due to retail price differences between two markets. In general, retail 
price arbitrage prevents the manufacturer from third-degree price discrimination; 
47 
however, Anderson and Ginsburg (1999) argue that consumers’ arbitrage behaviors 
provide the manufacturer a channel to second-degree price discrimination. They 
develop a two-country model with heterogeneous consumers to show that a firm with 
market power may have an incentive to create a second market in the second country, 
even if there is no local demand there. The intuition is that consumer’s arbitrage 
between two countries provides the firm a means to price discriminate across 
consumers in the first country.  
The analysis of the present paper follows the idea of Anderson and Ginsburg 
(1999). A consumer who purchases a game console from unauthorized channels has a 
strong tendency to play pirated or illegally obtained games.4 This kind of consumer 
has lower willingness to pay and thus parallel imports give the manufacturer a lead to 
distinguish high-type consumers and low-type consumers; hence second-degree price 
discrimination in the PI recipient country becomes feasible.  
The idea that parallel imports or pirated goods lead to second degree price 
discrimination is not new. Takeyama (1994) develops a model to discuss the impact of 
software piracy on software providers in the presence of network externalities. She 
finds that with network externality, piracy is an efficient means to expand network 
size and thus the copies are sold at one price (zero) while genuine product buyers are 
                                                      
4 One report on 2007.04.30 indicates that more than 80% Taiwanese consumers who purchased 
parallel imported Wii game consoles asked to modify the hardware to play pirated games. See The Sun, 
Hong Kong. 
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charged at a higher price. However, her model can’t be applied to video game piracy 
because her model does not take the hardware firm into account. Taking the hardware 
firm into consideration is important for discussing piracy in the video game market 
because the hardware is specific and perfectly complementary to the software. In 
other words, both hardware and software firms’ pricing behaviors will be pinned 
down by each other and thus we should not ignore hardware firm in the analysis of 
video game piracy. In addition, most papers that discuss software piracy only consider 
the story in a closed economy. In other words, they ignore the impact of PI on the 
hardware manufacturer and the software provider.  
To my knowledge, this paper is the first one that integrates software piracy and 
parallel imports. It sheds some lights on pricing by software and hardware firms when 
they feature complementary products and the hardware can be parallel traded while 
the other not. This paper argues that parallel trade in hardware is a channel used to let 
consumers reveal their preference for playing video games. Authorized hardware and 
PI are homogeneous to pirated software users (low type consumers) because after-sale 
service is not available for modified-hardware users. Therefore, the manufacturer can 
extract more profits from consumers by serving high type consumers by authorized 
products with a higher price and serving low type consumers by cheaper PI. Based on 
this idea, in this paper, I develop a simple model with one monopolistic hardware 
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manufacturer and one monopolistic software provider (where the hardware and the 
software are perfect complements) selling their products in two countries. Starting 
from the assumption that the hardware is protected by a region code which prevents 
consumers from using international version software, I show three results that are in 
contrast to general expectation. First, the software provider and the hardware 
manufacturer could both benefit from software piracy. Second, the hardware 
manufacturer may benefit from PI since PI can serve as a channel to second-degree 
price discrimination. Third, the consumers in the PI recipient country are not 
necessarily better off due to PI since the gains from an open policy might be offset if 
the hardware firm chooses to engage in price discrimination. Then to explain why 
Sony and Microsoft make their new generation game consoles region-free, I relax the 
region code assumption and show that, in equilibrium, imposing a region code on the 
hardware is redundant. All results in this study still hold for region-free hardware. 
This paper is organized as follows. A simple model is developed in section 2. 
Welfare analysis is given in section 3. Section 4 offers a short analysis of a region-free 
hardware and section 5 concludes. 
2. The Model 
In this section, we develop the basic non-cooperative game with a monopolistic 
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hardware manufacturer and one game provider.5 We will discuss two cases. First, 
let’s consider the impact of software piracy on the hardware manufacturer and the 
software provider respectively when parallel importation is not permitted. Second, we 
will discuss the impact of PI on both firms given software piracy. 
There are two countries, A and B. We assume that the total number of consumers 
in country A and B are normalized to unity. Consumers are heterogeneous in their 
value of playing video games. Let v denote a consumer’s gross utility of playing video 
games. The distribution of v in both countries is identical and is assumed to be a 
uniform distribution with support [0,1]. Here, the hardware is assumed to provide zero 
utility if it is not utilized with software.  
 
2.1  The Benchmark: The Basic Model with No Piracy 
Let’s consider the benchmark case: no piracy, no PI. The utility functions in both 
countries are given by 
U୧ ൌ ൜ݒ െ p୭BM௜ െ p୦BM௜        if purchasing the system0                                                         if no adoption   ݅ ൌ A, B                              ሺ3.1ሻ 
p୭BM௜  denotes the price of official software in country i and p୦BM௜  is the price of 
hardware in country i. The subscript BM indicates the variable for the benchmark 
case. 
                                                      
5 The assumption of non-cooperative game is briefly discussed in section 5. 
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Without loss of generality, we take country A as the discussing object. A 
consumer in country A with v ൒ p୭BMA ൅ p୦BMA  will purchase the system. For 
simplicity, we also assume that both hardware and software firms’ marginal cost are 
normalized to zero.6 Since each consumer purchases one unit of the product, the 
quantity demanded can be calculated by ׬ 1dxଵ୴ ൌ 1 െ p୭BMA െ p୦BMA . Now we can 
obtain both firms’ profit earned in country A: 
 
π୨BMA ൌ p୨BMA ൫1 െ p୭BMA െ p୦BMA ൯, j ൌ h, o                                                               ሺ3.2ሻ 
 
The optimization of (3.2) with respect to p୭BMA  and p୦BMA  indicates that  
p୭BMAכ ൌ p୦BMAכ ൌ ଵଷ  
Identical argument can be applied to country B and we will have  
p୭BMBכ ൌ p୦BMBכ ൌ ଵଷ  
Therefore, both firms’ profits in this benchmark case are identical and equal to the 
sum of profits in both countries given by ଶଽ. 
 
 
                                                      
6 This seems a stronger assumption on manufacturer’s marginal cost. Normalizing the marginal cost to 
zero helps simplify the analysis. The value of the marginal cost does affect values of the variables, such 
as the profit level, but will not affect the direction of the change in variables due to some scenarios 
demonstrated in our model since the marginal cost is a common factor in every stage. The main interest 
of this chapter is to discuss how firms’ profits and consumer’s welfare change and thus it is safe to 
normalize the marginal cost to zero. 
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2.2  Software Piracy When PI is Prohibited 
In this section, we consider the case where pirated software is available in country 
A. For simplicity, we assume that consumers in country B are unable to access pirated 
software. The utility function in country A now becomes 
UA ൌ ቐ
ݒ െ p୭PNA െ p୦PNA                                if purchasing official software
ሺ1 െ αሻݒ െ p୦PNA െ c ൅ δ                             if using illegal software
0                                                                                           if no adoption
          ሺ3.3ሻ 
The subscript PN indicates piracy exists while parallel imports do not. ሺ1 െ αሻ is a 
discount factor to the value v if the consumer modifies the hardware. Assume that by 
installing the modification chip on the hardware, users can bypass all security 
mechanism including region code. Here, α א ሺ0,1ሻ  because any unauthorized 
modification to the hardware will void warranty. The parameter  α  can also be 
interpreted as the probability that a hardware buyer needs after sale service.7 c ൐ 0 
refers to a fixed cost of modifying the hardware8. δ א ሺ0,1ሻ measures the extra 
benefit along with the hardware modification. For example, more powerful 
multimedia functions on a modified Microsoft XBOX.9 
Let vଵ be the value of one consumer who is indifferent between using official 
software and pirated copy. Therefore, vଵ െ p୭PNA െ p୦PNA ൌ ሺ1 െ αሻvଵ െ p୦PNA െ c ൅
                                                      
7 Some studies such as Takeyama (1994) and Bae and Choi (2006) consider ሺ1 െ αሻ as a utility 
discount factor for using pirated software. However, as stated in Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006), for 
video game piracy, the original and the copy have almost the same quality. Therefore, in this study, we 
will use ሺ1 െ αሻ to represent the utility discount factor due to loss of after-sale service. 
8 For example, a modification chip or a recordable DVD that is required to make and play a homebrew 
pirated Wii game. 
9 For more detail discussions on XBOX modification, see Schulz and Wagner (2008). 
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δ. A consumer will purchase official software if his valuation v ൐ vଵ ൌ ୮౥PN
A ିሺୡିδሻ
α . 
Thus, the quantity demanded for legitimate software is ׬ 1dxଵ୴భ ൌ 1 െ
୮౥PNA ିሺୡିδሻ
α . It is 
worthy to note that the quantity demanded for the official software is irrelevant to the 
hardware price since the hardware price does not play a role in consumer’s choice 
between legitimate software and pirated software. 
 
The software provider maximizes his profit in country A: 
max
୮౥PNA
 π୭PNA ൌ ሺ1 െ p୭PN
A െ c ൅ δ
α ሻp୭PN
A                                                                              ሺ3.4ሻ 
FOC indicates that the optimal official software price in country A, 
p୭PNAכ ൌ αାୡିδଶ א ሺ0,1ሻ                                                                                                          ሺ3.5ሻ 
   
Both official software buyers and pirated software users need to purchase the 
hardware. Let vଶ be the value of a consumer who is indifferent between using the 
system and not adoption. Therefore, consumers with v ൒ vଶ ൌ ୮౞PN
A ାୡିδ
ଵିఈ  will buy the 
hardware. The hardware manufacturer maximizes its profit in country A: 
max
୮౞PNA
π୦PNA ൌ ሺ1 െ p୦PN
A ൅ c െ δ
1 െ ߙ ሻp୦PN
A                                                                               ሺ3.6ሻ 
First order condition is൬1 െ ୮౞PNA ାୡିδଵିఈ ൰ െ
୮౞PNA
ଵିα ൌ 0. Solving the FOC to find the 
optimal hardware price in country A, we will have p୦PNAכ ൌ ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൐ 0. 
It is natural to assume that vଵ is greater than vଶ. Since α א ሺ0,1ሻ, this inequality 
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implies that c ൏ ߜ.10 
 
Proposition 1. The hardware manufacturer can sell more units when software piracy 
exists 
 
<Proof> If piracy is not available, the value v such that one consumer is indifferent 
between buying the system and not adoption is equal to ଶଷ. In other words, total 
quantity sold by the hardware manufacturer is ଵଷ of the total population. However, 
when software piracy is introduced, total hardware quantity sold is 1 െ vଶ ൌ 1 െ
ቆ
భషαషౙశδ
మ ାୡିδ
ଵିఈ ቇ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ ቀ1 ൅
δିୡ
ሺଵିαሻቁ ൐
ଵ
ଷ for c ൏ ߜ Q.E.D 
 
The profits that both firms can obtain in country B are identical to the benchmark 
case discussed in section 2.1. Total profits of the software provider can be calculated 
by substituting p୭PNAכ  into π୭PNA  and then plus the profit from country B. π୭PN, the 
profit of the software provider under the situation where software piracy exists while 
PI do not, is π୭PN ൌ ଵଽ ൅
ሺαାୡିδሻమ
ସα . The combined profit function of the hardware 
manufacturer becomes11 
                                                      
10 The derivation of this inequality is demonstrated in the appendix A1. 
11 It is easy to verify that 1 ൐ vଵ ൐ vଶ ൒  0. Any other situations do not hold. When vଶ ൑ 0, the 
market is fully served by the hardware manufacturer. However, vଶ will never be strictly less than zero 
because the hardware manufacturer has an incentive to increase the hardware price. 
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π୦PN ൌ 19 ൅
ሺ1 െ α െ c ൅ δሻଶ
4ሺ1 െ αሻ     for  1 ൐ vଵ ൐ vଶ ൒ 0                                                 ሺ3.7ሻ 
 
Now we can compare the profits obtained in section 2.2 to those calculated in the 
benchmark case to see the impact of software piracy on the hardware manufacturer 
and the software provider. The hardware manufacturer can (weakly) benefit from 
software piracy if π୦PN ൒  π୦BM ൌ ଶଽ. Solving this inequality, we have  
൞
െሺܿ െ ߜሻ ൏ ߙ ൑ 1 ൅ ሺܿ െ ߜሻ                                           if െ 12 ൏ ሺܿ െ ߜሻ ൑ െ
1
9
െሺܿ െ ߜሻ ൏ ߙ ൑ 19 ൫7 െ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻ൯ െ
2
9 ඥ1 ൅ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻ if െ
1
9 ൑ ሺܿ െ ߜሻ ൏ 0
   ሺ3.8ሻ 
 
Similarly, the software provider can earn a higher profit if π୭PN ൒  π୭BM ൌ ଶଽ. That is  
ଶ
ଽ ඥ1 െ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻ ൅
ଵ
ଽ ൫2 െ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻ൯ ൑ ߙ ൑ 1 ൅ ሺܿ െ ߜሻ    
݂݅ ଵଵ଼ ൫െ8 ൅ √19൯ ൑ ሺܿ െ ߜሻ ൏ 0                                                                                     ሺ3.9ሻ 
  
The combination of ሺα, c െ δሻ  where the hardware manufacturer and the 
software provider can benefit from piracy can be described by the dark (light) area in 
figure 3.1. The medium dark area is the intersection of dark area and light area, which 
indicates the combination of ሺα, c െ δሻ  where both hardware manufacturer and 
software provider benefit from software piracy.  
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Proposition 2. The software provider does not necessarily suffer from piracy. 
Furthermore, there exist several combinations of  ߙ  and ܿ െ ߜ  such that both 
hardware and software firms can benefit from piracy. i.e. the medium dark area in 
figure 3.1. In more detail, 
 
α א ൤ଶඥଵିଽሺୡିδሻଽ ൅
ଶିଽሺୡିδሻ
ଽ , 1 ൅ ܿ െ ߜ ൨    
׊ሺܿ െ ߜሻ א ቂ ଵଵ଼ ൫െ8 ൅ √19൯, െ
ଵ
ଽቃ                                                                                   ሺ3.10ሻ  
 or  
α א ቂଶଽ ඥ1 െ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻ ൅
ଵ
ଽ ൫2 െ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻ൯,
ଵ
ଽ ൫7 െ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻ൯ െ
ଶ
ଽ ඥ1 ൅ 9ሺܿ െ ߜሻቃ   
׊ሺܿ െ ߜሻ א ൬െ 19 , 0൰                                                                                                         ሺ3.11ሻ 
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The software firm prefers large α and small ሺδ െ cሻ while the hardware prefers 
the reverse. To see why it is possible for the software firm to benefit from piracy, let’s 
go back to the derivation of quantity demanded for the official software. In the 
benchmark case, where no piracy exists, the marginal consumer compares the surplus 
between buying the system and no adoption. Both hardware price and software price 
affect his/her choice. The inverse demand function for software in the benchmark case 
is p୭BM ൌ 1 െ q୭BM െ p୦BM, which is a linear inverse demand with slope -1 and 
The probability that the hardware 
needs after‐sale service 
The difference betw
een fixed cost 
and extra benefit of m
odification 
The dark area indicates 
that the hardware firm 
benefits from piracy. 
The light area indicates that the 
software firm benefits from piracy 
The medium dark area indicates that 
both firms benefit from piracy. 
Figure 3.1: The area where the firms can benefit from piracy 
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intercept ሺ1 െ p୦BMሻ. However, in a model with piracy, hardware price won’t affect 
the choice of the marginal consumer who considers whether to buy the legitimate 
software or to pirate the software. The inverse demand function for the software in the 
case with piracy is p୭PN ൌ αሺ1 െ q୭PNሻ െ ሺδ െ cሻ, which is a linear inverse demand 
with slope െα and intercept ሺα െ ሺδ െ cሻሻ. The parameter α can measure how 
elastic the software demand is. Since α ൏ 1, the inverse demand function for the 
software in the case with piracy is flatter than the benchmark. However, the inverse 
demand function is also controlled by the intercept. With a sufficiently small number 
of ሺδ െ cሻ, i.e. ሺδ െ cሻ is sufficiently closed to zero, such that ሺδ െ cሻ is smaller 
than p୦BM, the software provider in fact faces a larger market in the case with piracy 
than in the benchmark case as long as α is not too small. In other words, comparing 
the result in this section to the benchmark case, if the “disadvantage” due to elasticity 
(α) can be covered by the gain from consumer’s willingness to pay (larger intercept 
captured by small ሺδ െ cሻ), the software firm can benefit from piracy.  
The existence of piracy enables the hardware manufacturer to sell more units. 
When pirated software is available, the hardware manufacturer can set the price 
without taking the software provider’s action into consideration because the marginal 
consumer who decides whether to buy the hardware or not does not care about the 
price of the official software since he/she uses illegal copy of the software. Similarly, 
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the marginal consumer of the legitimate software does not take the hardware price 
into consideration because the hardware is required no matter whether the official or 
illegal software is chosen. In other words, both firms won’t be pinned down by each 
other and thus have higher market power to some extent relative to the benchmark 
case where the outcome depends on the pricing behavior of each other. That’s why for 
certain parameter sets, both firms can benefit from piracy. However, it is somewhat 
surprising that the hardware manufacturer suffers from piracy on the light region of 
figure 3.1, where α is sufficiently large and c െ δ is also sufficiently large (closed 
to zero). In proposition 1, we show that the quantity demanded for the hardware will 
increase due to piracy; however, it does not guarantee that the hardware 
manufacturer’s profit will increase as well. To see this, let’s check the inverse demand 
function of the hardware when piracy exists. The inverse demand function of the 
hardware is p୦BM ൌ ሺ1 െ αሻ െ ሺc െ δሻ െ ሺ1 െ αሻq୦BM. When α is sufficiently large 
and ሺc െ δሻ is sufficiently closed to zero, the linear inverse demand curve is flat with 
a small intercept indicating that consumer’s willingness to pay for the hardware is low. 
In addition, a large α  means that the degradation cost of modification is high, while 
a large ሺc െ δሻ means the net benefit along with modification is small. Both indicate 
that modification is not attractive suggesting that consumer’s willingness to pay is low. 
As a consequence, in extreme circumstances, it is still possible for the hardware 
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manufacturer to suffer from piracy.  
 
2.3  Software Piracy When PI is Considered 
In this section, we consider the case such that consumers in country A can choose 
to buy the hardware from either country A or country B. The hardware purchased 
from country B is called a parallel import. We can imagine that there are many traders 
who purchase the hardware from retail markets in country B and sell the product in 
country A. Eventually, PI traders earn zero profit with free entry assumption. However, 
if a consumer purchases a PI hardware, some modifications to the hardware are 
required to bypass the region code safeguard. In addition, because the regulation on 
multimedia product is stronger in reality, we assume that the parallel importation of 
software is prohibited between two countries.12 Since we assume that the hardware is 
protected by a region code, it will be one-way PI from country B to country A because 
we assume that the modification chip is not available in country B. Given our model 
specification, we would claim that all PI hardware buyers will pirate the software. The 
reason is straightforward because if a consumer purchases PI hardware but buys 
official software, his utility is ሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦B െ c െ t ൅ δ െ p୭A, which is strictly less 
than ሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦B െ c െ t ൅ δ, the utility obtained by pirating software. Here, a 
                                                      
12 For example, parallel imports of copyrighted works are considered to be a copyright infringement. 
See Article 87(4) , Taiwan Copyright Law.  
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nonnegative parameter t represents the international shipping cost.13 
The hardware manufacturer has two options to serve country A. The first option is 
to serve all consumers in country A by selling its product and charging a single price 
p୦A. The other option is to fulfill the demand in country A by both authorized products 
and parallel imports simultaneously. In the later case, there will be two different prices, 
the price of the authorized hardware (p୦A) and the price of PI (p୦B ൅ tሻ. Let’s discuss 
both cases in section 2.3.1 and section 2.3.2. 
 
2.3.1 Regime 1: The hardware manufacturer serves country A by authorized 
products only (Deter PI by setting ܘܐۯ ൌ ܘܐ۰ ൅ ܜ ): 
 
Since we assume that the hardware is protected by a region code, in this case, it 
will be one-way PI from B to A because we assume that the modification chip is not 
available in country B. The manufacturer will maximize his profit by solving the 
following optimization problem: 
max
ሼ୮౞A,୮౞Bሽ
π୦DP ൌ p୦DPA ሺ1 െ p୦DP
A ൅ c െ δ
1 െ α ሻ ൅ p୦DP
B ൫1 െ p୦DPB െ p୭DPB ൯                ሺ3.12ሻ 
subject to p୦DPA ൌ p୦DPB ൅ t and ଵି஑ିୡାஔଶ ൒
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t 14 
                                                      
13 We do not assume search cost on PI because we assume there are many PI traders in the economy. 
This is particular true for small open economies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, where PI are very 
common and popular. Thus, we assume the extra search cost for PI is insignificant and can be ignored. 
14 If ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൏
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t, PI in this regime won’t occur and the result is identical to section 2.2. 
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In other words, the manufacturer maximizes profits by setting two prices in two 
countries to prevent consumers from buying the hardware from unauthorized 
channels. 
 
The software provider’s profit maximization problem is 
max
൛୮౥A,୮౥Bൟ
π୭DP ൌ p୭DPA ቆ1 െ p୭DP
A െ c ൅ δ
α ቇ ൅ p୭DP
B ൫1 െ p୦DPB െ p୭DPB ൯              ሺ3.13ሻ 
      
Solving the first order conditions of both firms simultaneously, we have 
p୭DPA ൌ α ൅ c െ δ2  
p୦DPA ൌ 3
ሺ1 െ αሻ െ 2ሺc െ δሻ െ 4t
7 െ 3α ൅ t 
p୦DPB ൌ 3
ሺ1 െ αሻ െ 2ሺc െ δሻ െ 4t
7 െ 3α  
p୭DPB ൌ 2 ൅ c െ δ ൅ 2t7 െ 3α  
The optimization problem is identical to section 2.2 but with one restriction, 
p୦A ൌ p୦B ൅ t. However, it is premature to claim that the hardware manufacturer 
will suffer from deterring PI. When drawing a 3D graph on the space of α, t and 
c െ δ, we can verify that the hardware manufacturer will benefit from deterring PI. 
Figure 3.2 (figure 3.3) shows the region where the hardware manufacturer benefits 
(suffers) from PI. We get an empty set in figure 3.3 suggesting that the profit if the 
hardware manufacturer will increase if the manufacturer sets the prices to deter PI. 
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Figure 3.2 The region where the hardware 
manufacturer can benefit from permitting PI 
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The reason for the hardware manufacturer to benefit from an open policy on 
parallel importation even when he chooses to deter PI is that when parallel 
importation is allowed, parallel imports in this scenario make the prices of hardware 
in two countries convergent. The software provider will respond to the increase15 of 
p୦B by cutting the price of the software in country B. Since the hardware and the 
                                                      
15 It is easy to check that p୦DPB ൌ ଷሺଵି஑ሻିଶሺୡିஔሻିସ୲଻ିଷ஑ ൒
ଵ
ଷ given 
ଵି஑ିୡାஔ
ଶ ൒
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t. 
0.0
0.5
1.0
a
-1.0 -0.5 0.0
c-d
0.0
0.2
0.4
t
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
International 
shipping cost 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 3.3 The region where the hardware 
manufacturer suffers from permitting PI (Empty Set) 
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software are complements, the decrease in software price will increase the demand for 
the hardware. In other words, parallel trade is a commitment device for the hardware 
manufacturer to raise the hardware price in country B and thus parallel trade enables 
the hardware firm to extract profits from the software provider. In short, even though 
the hardware firm suffers in the PI recipient country by deterring PI, the 
complementarity between the hardware and the software enables the hardware firm to 
benefit in the parallel exporting country. As consequence, the benefit in country B 
dominates the loss in country A. 
The software provider’s profit in country A will not change. However, given our 
parameter restriction, ଵି஑ିୡାஔଶ ൒
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t, the software provider’s profit will decrease in 
country B because both price and quantity demanded for the software in country B 
decrease.16  
 
2.3.2 Regime 2: The hardware manufacturer serves country A by both 
authorized products and PI (Accommodate PI): 
 
If ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൏
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t, in the specification of section 2.3.1, PI won’t occur. However, 
parallel importation is still possible in another scenario which is the one we will 
                                                      
16 p୦DPB ൅ p୭DPB  is greater than ଶଷ (the value in the benchmark case) and p୭DPB ൌ
ଶାୡିδାଶ୲
଻ିଷα ൏
ଵ
ଷ (the 
price charged by the software firm in the benchmark case) provided that ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൒
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t 
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discuss in this section. The hardware manufacturer can utilize parallel imports as a 
channel to price discrimination. Since illegal software users have to modify the 
hardware, after-sale service is not available even if they purchase the hardware from 
authorized channels. The only concern that illegal software users have in mind in 
choosing the hardware provider is the price of the hardware. If authorized hardware is 
cheaper than PI, no consumers will purchase PI, which is either an uninteresting case 
or has been discussed in section 2.3.1. Therefore, in this section, we will consider the 
case where the hardware price in country A is higher than the price of PI, which is the 
hardware price in country B plus shipping cost. The price gap sustains even when 
parallel importation exists because PI is now a channel to separating different types of 
consumers. In our specification, all illegal software users will buy PI and only those 
consumers who purchase official software will buy the authorized hardware. 
Consumer’s preference in country A and country B can be described by 
UA ൌ ቐ
ݒ െ p୦A െ p୭A                                   if purchasing the legitimate system
ሺ1 െ αሻݒ െ p୦B െ t െ c ൅ δ                if using pirated software and PI 
0                                                                                                if no adoption 
  ;  
UB ൌ ൜ݒ െ p୦B െ p୭B                                                         if purchasing the system0                                                                                                  if no adoption 
We can now obtain the profit functions of both hardware and software firms. 
The hardware manufacturer’s profit maximization problem is  
max
൛୮౞APA ,୮౞APB ൟ
π୦AP ൌ p୦APB ൫1 െ p୭APB െ p୦APB ൯ 
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൅p୦APB ቆpOAP
A ൅ p୦APA െ p୦APB െ t െ c ൅ δ
α െ
p୦APB ൅ t ൅ c െ δ
1 െ α ቇ
൅ p୦APA ቆ1 െ p୭AP
A ൅ p୦APA െ p୦APB െ t െ c ൅ δ
α ቇ                            ሺ3.14ሻ  
s.t. 1 ൐ ୮౥APA ା୮౞APA ି୮౞APB ି୲ିୡାδα ൐
୮౞APB ା୲ାୡିδ
ଵିα ൒ 0 and p୦APA ൐ p୦APB ൅ t   
The derivation of (3.14) is shown in appendix A2. The first term in the profit function 
is the profit obtained in country B where piracy is absent. The second term describes 
the profit from PI and the last term in the profit function is the profit from selling 
authorized hardware in country A. ሺ୮OAPA ା୮౞APA ି୮౞APB ି୲ିୡାδα െ
୮౞APB ା୲ାୡିδ
ଵିα ሻ captures the 
PI volume while ሺ1 െ ୮౥APA ା୮౞APA ି୮౞APB ି୲ିୡାδα ሻ describes the quantity demanded for 
the authorized hardware in country A. The later inequality comes from the assumption 
that the hardware manufacturer serves country A by both authorized products and 
parallel imports. If it were violated, the result will be identical to the one of deterring 
PI. 
 
Similarly, the software provider maximizes his profit 
π୭AP ൌ p୭APB ൫1 െ p୭APB െ p୦APB ൯
൅ p୭APA ቆ1 െ p୭AP
A ൅ p୦APA െ p୦APB െ t െ c ൅ δ
α ቇ                              ሺ3.15ሻ 
First order conditions imply  
p୭APA ൌ α ൅ c െ δ ൅ t3  
p୭APB ൌ 2 ൅ c െ δ ൅ t7 െ 3α  
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p୦APA ൌ 9 െ 2ߙ െ 3α
ଶ ൅ ሺ1 െ 3ߙሻሺܿ െ ߜ ൅ ݐሻ
3ሺ7 െ 3ܽሻ  
p୦APB ൌ 3 െ 3ߙ െ 2ሺܿ െ ߜ ൅ ݐሻ7 െ 3ߙ  
subject to17 
0 ൑ t ൏ ݉݅݊ሾα ൅ c െ δ2 ,
7ሺc െ δሻ െ αሺ6α െ 5ሻሺെ1 ൅ α ൅ c െ δሻ
െ7 ൅ αሺ6α െ 5ሻ ሿ 
 
 Comparing this set of prices to that in the case of deterring PI, given the 
constraints on t, we have the following results: p୦APA ൐ p୦DPA , p୦APB ൐ p୦DPB , 
p୭APA ൏ p୭DPA , and p୭APB ൏ p୭DPB . In other words, the manufacturer charges higher 
prices while the software provider reduces the prices in both countries if the hardware 
manufacturer chooses to accommodate PI. The reason for an increase in hardware 
price in country B builds on an increase in demand for country B’s hardware since 
consumers who pirate the software will purchase the hardware from country B. One 
should note that the extra demand in hardware from country B does not accompany 
with an increase in the demand for country B’s official software. Actually, the increase 
in demand for country B’s hardware is harmful for the software provider in country B. 
Since PI will raise the price of country B’s hardware, fewer consumers in country B 
are willing to purchase the system (hardware plus software) and thus the demand for 
the software in country B decreases. Therefore, the price of software in country B 
                                                      
17 t ൏ αାୡିδଶ  because p୦A ൐ p୦B ൅ t ; t ൏
଻ሺୡିδሻିαሺ଺αିହሻሺିଵାαାୡିδሻ
ି଻ାαሺ଺αିହሻ  because vଵ ൐ vଶ. 
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falls. It is not surprising to see that the price of authorized hardware in country A 
increases. But now, the software price in country A is affected by the price of 
hardware because by checking (3.14), we can see that the marginal consumer is 
considering the price gap between the authorized hardware and PI. The same 
argument in the analysis of a decrease in software price can be applied to country A, 
which is an increase in the hardware price leads to a decrease in software price.  
 
 
  
 
 
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
International 
shipping cost 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 3.4 The region where the hardware manufacturer can benefit 
by accommodating PI 
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Figure 3.4 shows the region where the hardware manufacturer can benefit from 
PI by accommodating PI without assuming ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൒
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t. When 
ଵିαିୡାδ
ଶ ൏
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t,  
setting price according to the story in a closed economy is one option; however, our 
result indicates that closed economy pricing might not be optimal for the manufacturer. 
The manufacturer can utilize PI as a channel to distinguish two types of consumers 
and obtain higher profits. This idea can be realized because illegal software users do 
not care about after-sale service and thus are more sensitive to hardware price. 
Cheaper PI help the manufacturer identify two types of consumers. Let’s summarize 
the strategies that the manufacturer can adopt in different situations in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 The strategies that are available for the manufacturer to adopt 
 Strategy 
Condition Closed economy Deter PI Accommodate PI 
1 െ α െ c ൅ δ
2 ൒
1
3 ൅ t  No Yes Yes 
1 െ α െ c ൅ δ
2 ൏
1
3 ൅ t  Yes No Yes 
 
When ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൒
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t, whether AP dominates DP or not depends on the values 
of parameters. However, that won’t affect the conclusion that PI is always beneficial 
for the manufacturer when ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൒
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t since in section 2.3.1, we show that by 
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deterring PI, the manufacturer can always raise the profit. In section 2.3.2, we also 
show that when ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൏
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t, in certain circumstances which are demonstrated in 
figure 3.4, the manufacturer might earn even higher profit than he could in the closed 
economy by encouraging PI. In other words, the manufacturer can adopt a proper 
strategy (AP or closed economy pricing) such that his profit is greater or equal to what 
he can earn in the closed economy for ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൏
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t . Combining these results 
gives proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3. Parallel imports are never harmful to the hardware manufacturer.  
 
We can then discuss the impact of hardware manufacturer’s second degree price 
discrimination behavior on the software provider’s profit. The quantity demanded for 
legitimate software in country A is ൬1 െ ୮౥APA ା୮౞APA ି୮౞APB ି୲ିୡାδα ൰, which is smaller 
than the quantity demanded in the closed economy, ቀ1 െ ୮౥APA ି୲ିୡାδα ቁ  because 
p୦APA െ p୦APB ൐ 0 in regime 2. In addition, the price of the software in country A also 
decreases. The same argument applies to country B. Therefore, the profit of the 
software provider will decrease if the hardware manufacturer accommodates PI. This 
result is not surprising because the hardware price in regime 2 is higher than that in 
regime 1 and thus the software provider’s profit falls given the fact that the hardware 
72 
and the software are perfect complements.  
 
3. Welfare Analysis 
We will first demonstrate a comparison of consumer surplus with and without 
software piracy. Then, we will discuss the impact of PI on consumer’s welfare.  
 
3.1 Consumer’s welfare change with software piracy when hardware PI is 
prohibited 
To compare changes in consumer surplus (CS) due to software piracy, let’s first 
calculate the CS in both countries for the benchmark case. i.e. the consumer welfare 
when piracy and PI are not available.  
 
CSNNA ൌ CSNNB ൌ න ሺv െ 13
ଵ
ଶ
ଷ
െ 13ሻdv ൌ
1
18                                                                     ሺ3.16ሻ 
where the subscript NN denotes “No piracy” and “No PI”. 
 
If there is illegal software copy in country A, the welfare in country A becomes 
CSPNA ൌ න ሺሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦PNAכ െ c ൅ δሻdv
୴భ
୴మ
൅ න ൫v െ p୦PNAכ െ p୭PNAכ ൯dv
ଵ
୴భ
                ሺ3.17ሻ 
where 
73 
vଵ ൌ
α ൅ c െ δ
2 െ ሺc െ δሻ
α , vଶ ൌ
1 െ α െ ሺc െ δሻ
2 ൅ c െ δ
1 െ α , 
 p୦PNAכ ൌ 1 െ α െ
ሺc െ δሻ
2 , p୭PN
Aכ ൌ α ൅ c െ δ2  
where the subscript PN denotes “Piracy” and “No PI”. 
 
Let the consumer’s welfare change in country A be ∆CSPNA ൌ CSPNA െ CSNNA . We 
can verify that the consumer’s surplus will increase by checking figure 3.5. From the 
graph, we see ∆CSPNA  is always positive on the same domain of figure 3.1 suggesting 
that consumers are always better off when software piracy exists. In section 2.2, we 
have explained that both firms might be better off due to piracy in certain 
circumstances. (i.e. the medium dark area in figure 3.1.) Combining the results in 
section 2.2 and the present section, we can say that software piracy could be Pareto 
improving. Lemma 1 summarizes this finding. 
 
Lemma 1. If hardware parallel importation is not permitted, the existence of software 
piracy might be Pareto improving. 
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The reason for firms to be better off when piracy exists has been discussed in 
section 2.2 and thus we won’t repeat it here. The intuition for an increase in 
consumer’s welfare is as follows. Software piracy can lower consumers’ threshold of 
adoption since low type consumers can also be served by the hardware manufacturer.  
 
3.2 Welfare change due to parallel imports given software piracy 
In this section, we are going to discuss welfare change in both countries due to 
parallel imports. Since the manufacturer has two options to serve country A (deterring 
PI and accommodating PI), we will discuss two scenarios respectively. 
Changes in consumer 
surplus 
The probability that the hardware 
needs after-sale service 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 3.5. Consumer’s welfare change is positive 
when software piracy is present. 
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Scenario 1: Deterring PI 
Let the consumer’s surplus in country A and B when the manufacturer deters PI 
be 
CSDPA ൌ න ቀሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦DPA െ c ൅ δቁ dv
୴భDP
୴మDP
൅ න ൫v െ p୦DPA െ p୭DPA ൯dv
ଵ
୴భDP
         ሺ3.18ሻ 
CSDPB ൌ න ൫1 െ p୭DPB െ p୦DPB ൯dv
ଵ
୮౥DPB ା୮౞DPB
                                                                    ሺ3.19ሻ 
 
where vଵDP ൌ
αశౙషδ
మ ିୡାδ
α  , vଶDP ൌ
యሺభషαሻషమሺౙషδሻషర౪
ళషయα ା୲ାୡିδ
ଵିα , p୭DPA ൌ
αାୡିδ
ଶ , 
p୦DPA ൌ ଷሺଵିαሻିଶሺୡିδሻିସ୲଻ିଷα ൅ t, p୦DPB ൌ
ଷሺଵିαሻିଶሺୡିδሻିସ୲
଻ିଷα  and p୭DPB ൌ
ଶାୡିδାଶ୲
଻ିଷα  
 
The consumer’s welfare change due to PI in country A is now ∆CSDPA ൌ CSDPA െ
CSPNA . We can conclude that if deterring PI is the manufacturer’s best response, 
consumer’s surplus in country A will increase for sure. This result is not surprising. If, 
in equilibrium, the manufacturer chooses to deter PI, he needs to cut the hardware 
price in the PI recipient country. In addition, the software provider will not change his 
pricing behavior because vଵ does not change. In other words, the marginal consumer 
who is indifferent between official games and pirated games will not change his/her 
decision since for the marginal consumer, playing official games is still as appealing 
as playing pirated games even though we have a decrease of the hardware price. 
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The consumer’s welfare in country B can be calculated through the change of the 
system price, which is the sum of hardware price and software price because by the 
assumption that there’s no piracy in country B, consumers in country B will buy the 
hardware as well as the legitimate software. The consumer’s surplus in country B will 
decrease because of the increase of hardware price. Even though the software firm 
responses to the increase of hardware price by cutting software price, the sum of 
hardware price and software price in country B still goes up. Therefore, if the 
hardware manufacturer deters PI, consumers in country A will benefit while 
consumers in country B will be worse off.  
The software provider won’t be affected in country A but will suffer in country B 
as we analyzed in section 2.3.1. Thus, if the hardware manufacturer deters PI, the 
software provider will be worse off. 
 
Scenario 2: Accommodating PI 
 
If the hardware manufacturer chooses to accommodate PI, the consumer’s 
surplus in country A and B will be 
CSAPA ൌ න ቀሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦APB െ t െ c ൅ δቁ dv
୴భAP
୴మAP
൅ න ൫v െ p୦APA െ p୭APA ൯dv
ଵ
୴భAP
   ሺ3.20ሻ 
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CSAPB ൌ න ൫v െ p୦APB െ p୭APB ൯dv
ଵ
୮౞APB ା୮౥APB
                                                                     ሺ3.21ሻ 
 
To explain the impact of AP on consumer welfare, we need to discuss two cases: 
 
Case 1: ૚ିહି܋ା઼૛ ൒
૚
૜ ൅ t 
 
In this case, the manufacturer has two options: deterring PI and accommodating 
PI. Accommodating PI is optimal for the manufacturer if π୦AP ൐ π୦DP. Therefore, to 
discuss how consumer’s surplus changes when the manufacturer chooses 
accommodating PI, π୦AP ൐ π୦DP is a preliminary condition. In this case, the change 
in consumer’s welfare in country A is ambiguous; however consumers in country B 
are worse off. Figure 3.6 (Figure 3.7) depicts the region where consumers in country 
A benefit (suffer) from accommodating PI. Both graphs are nonempty suggesting that 
we can’t assert if the consumers in the PI recipient country are better off or worse off. 
Applying the same technique to the analysis of consumer’s welfare change in country 
B, we find that the region for consumers in country B to be better off is empty 
suggesting that consumer’s surplus decreases in country B. 
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The difference between fixed  
cost and extra benefit of  
modification 
International 
shipping cost 
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
Figure 3.6 The region where consumers in country A are better 
off if the manufacturer accommodates PI for ૚ିહି܋ା઼૛ ൒
૚
૜ ൅ ܜ 
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Case 2: ૚ିહି܋ା઼૛ ൏
૚
૜ ൅ ܜ 
 
The manufacturer will choose either closed economy pricing or accommodating 
PI. If accommodating PI is the manufacturer’s best choice, then the consumers in the 
PI recipient country will be worse off since the region where π୦AP ൐ π୦PN and 
International 
shipping cost 
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
The difference between  
fixed cost and extra benefit of 
modification 
Figure 3.7 The region where consumers in country A are worse 
off if the manufacturer accommodates PI for ૚ିહି܋ା઼૛ ൒
૚
૜ ൅ ܜ 
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CSAPA ൐ CSPNA  simultaneously hold is empty under the condition of ଵିαିୡାδଶ ൏
ଵ
ଷ ൅ t. 
Figure 3.8 shows the region where consumers in country A suffer from 
accommodating PI. We do not provide the graph which indicates that the consumers 
are better off since the region is just empty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
International 
shipping cost 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 3.8 The region where consumers in country A suffer from 
accommodating PI for ૚ିહି܋ା઼૛ ൏
૚
૜ ൅ ܜ 
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Consumers in country B will be better off in this case. Figure 3.9 depicts the 
region where consumers in country B benefit from accommodating PI. Since the 
region where consumers in country B suffer from accommodating PI is empty, we 
don’t provide the graph here. 
 
 
 
    
                          
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
International 
shipping cost 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 3.9 The region where consumers in country B benefit from 
accommodating PI for ૚ିહି܋ା઼૛ ൏
૚
૜ ൅ ܜ 
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Table 3.2 summarizes welfare change due to software piracy and table 3.3 
summarizes welfare change due to parallel imports. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Welfare Change Due to Piracy  
 
Piracy in country A 
(Closed Economy) 
Hardware Firm +/- 
Software Firm +/- 
Consumer in A + 
Consumer in B unchanged 
 
 
Table 3.3  Welfare Change Due to PI 
  Deter PI Accommodate PI 
૚ െ હ െ ܋ ൅ ઼
૛ ൒
૚
૜ ൅ ܜ 
Hardware Firm + + 
Software Firm - - 
Consumer in A + +/- 
Consumer in B - - 
૚ െ હ െ ܋ ൅ ઼
૛ ൏
૚
૜ ൅ ܜ 
Hardware Firm N/A + 
Software Firm N/A - 
Consumer in A N/A - 
Consumer in B N/A + 
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In this section, I demonstrate welfare implication of PI. It should be noted that 
unlike piracy which creates extra demand for hardware, the way for the hardware 
manufacturer to benefit from PI is to extract profits from the software firm. When 
closed-economy hardware price in country A is higher than the sum of retail price in 
country B and international shipping cost, the hardware manufacturer can respond to 
the price gap either by deterring PI or by accommodating PI. On the other hand, 
deterring PI is not applicable for the case where closed-economy hardware price in 
country A is lower than the sum of retail price in country B and international shipping 
cost. Deterring PI is beneficial for the hardware manufacturer since parallel trade 
from country B to country A is now a commitment device for the hardware 
manufacturer to raise the price in country B allowing the hardware firm to extract 
profits from the software firm in country B. Moreover, the hardware manufacturer can 
utilize PI as a channel to distinguish high type and low type consumers to earn even 
more profits. In other words, for certain circumstances, the hardware manufacturer 
may find it profitable to serve country A by both authorized products and PI. 
Authorized product buyers in country A are charged at a higher price while pirated 
game players are charged at a lower price. Since the price of authorized hardware 
increases in this case, the price of legitimate software in country A must decrease, and 
thus the software firm will suffer if the hardware firm chooses to accommodate PI. 
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Consumer’s welfare implication is also intuitive. Deterring PI lowers the hardware 
price in country A suggesting that the consumers in country A are better off; while 
consumers in the parallel exporting country will be worse off due to price 
convergence between two countries as stated in Malueg and Schwartz (1994).  
The welfare implication of accommodating PI is as follows. If the hardware 
manufacturer accommodates PI to realize second price discrimination, the profits of 
the software firm are further extracted by the hardware firm due to an increase in 
hardware price in both countries. Hence, accommodating PI is harmful for the 
software firm. As for consumer’s welfare, the impact of accommodating PI on 
consumer’s welfare depends on the autarky price of the hardware. As stated in the 
economic textbook, cēterīs paribus, price discrimination is harmful for consumers. 
When the closed-economy hardware price in country A is high, allowing PI is 
generally beneficial for consumers in country A; however, the benefits could be 
eroded if the hardware firm chooses to utilize PI as the channel to achieve price 
discrimination. Therefore, when the autarky hardware price in country A is high, the 
impact of accommodating PI on consumer’s welfare in country A is ambiguous. On 
the other hand, when the autarky hardware price in country A is low, consumers in 
country A can’t obtain any benefits from an open policy but need to bear the welfare 
loss due to price discrimination. Hence, consumers in country A are worse off in the 
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case of accommodating PI when the autarky hardware price in country A is low.  
We can apply the same argument to explain the consumer’s welfare change in 
country B in the case of accommodating PI. It should be noted that when the autarky 
hardware price in country A is low, parallel trade will occur only in the form of 
accommodating PI. To make PI possible, the hardware manufacturer needs to reduce 
the price in country B from 1/3 to a lower level in order to attract low type consumers 
in country A. Therefore, if the autarky hardware price in country A is low and 
accommodating PI is the equilibrium, consumers in country B will be better off.  
 
4. Region-free Hardware 
If the hardware is region-free, the PI recipient country could be country A or 
country B. Suppose that country A is the PI recipient country, the claim that all 
consumers who purchase PI hardware will pirate the software still holds. The reason 
is as follows. Since the manufacturer does not provide after-sale service to a PI buyer, 
an official game player who purchases PI hardware has a surplus of ሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦B െ
t െ p୭A, which is smaller than ሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦B െ t െ c ൅ δ given the fact that c ൏ p୭A 
and δ ൐ 0. Therefore, if country A is the PI recipient country, the result won’t change 
even though the hardware is region-free. 
However, is it possible for country B to be the PI recipient country when the 
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hardware is region-free? Our model shows that country B can’t be the PI recipient 
country. First, we will claim that serving country B only by authorized products 
(deterring PI) is not feasible by simple steps. Let vଵB be the valuation of the marginal 
consumer who is indifferent between authorized hardware and PI in country B. vଵB 
must satisfy vଵB െ p୦B െ p୭B ൌ ሺ1 െ αሻvଵB െ ൫p୦A ൅ t൯ െ p୭B  and is equal to ଵ஑ ሺp୦B െ
p୦A െ tሻ . Similarly, let vଶB  be the valuation of the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between PI and no adoption. We have vଶB ൌ ଵଵି஑ ሺp୦A ൅ t ൅ p୭Bሻ. Since 
vଵB ൐ vଶB , we have ଵ஑ ൫p୦B െ p୦A െ t൯ ൐
ଵ
ଵି஑ ሺp୦A ൅ t ൅ p୭Bሻ . Solving this inequality 
implies p୦B െ ሺp୦A ൅ tሻ ൐ ߙሺp୦B ൅ p୭Bሻ . However, deterring PI implies that p୦B ൌ
ሺp୦A ൅ tሻ , which is a contradiction to p୦B െ ൫p୦A ൅ t൯ ൐ ߙ൫p୦B ൅ p୭B൯ ൐ 0  given 
positive prices assumptions.  
We have shown that p୦B ൌ ሺp୦A ൅ tሻ does not hold, but on the other hand, in 
equilibrium, can we have p୦B ൐ ሺp୦A ൅ tሻ, which is the case that the manufacturer 
serves country B by both authorized products and PI simultaneously? Our work in the 
appendix A3 proves that this is still infeasible for the manufacturer. In summary, even 
though the hardware is region free, it is still a one-way PI outcome from country B to 
country A. 
 This result can explain why Sony and Microsoft make their new game console 
region-free. As stated above, embedding a region code on the hardware is redundant 
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since the region code does not play any role. Parallel trade occurs from country B to 
country A no matter whether there is region code or not.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We analyze the impact of outlaw innovations on the video game market. We 
obtain three results that are different from general expectation. Firstly, we discuss the 
existence of software piracy in a closed economy. Our benchmark model indicates 
that the hardware manufacturer may benefit from piracy as expected by most people. 
However, we also find that software piracy may also be beneficial to the software 
provider. Secondly, we extend our closed-economy model to a two-country model 
where the modification chips are available in one country but are unavailable in the 
other. We show that the existence of hardware parallel imports is beneficial to the 
hardware manufacturer but is harmful to the software provider. Thirdly, our welfare 
analysis shows that the consumers in the PI recipient country are not necessarily 
better off. If the hardware manufacturer deters PI, consumers in the PI recipient 
country will benefit as expected. However, if the hardware provider chooses to serve 
the country by both authorized products and parallel imports, PI provide the 
manufacturer a key to second-degree price discriminating the consumers in the PI 
recipient country. In this case, consumers in the PI recipient country may be worse 
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off. 
This paper considers a non-cooperative game; however, some may argue that it is 
possible for both software and hardware firms to cooperate and offer a bundle of 
hardware and software to prevent piracy. In appendix A4, it is shown that there does 
not exist a way to distribute the joint profit such that both firms are willing to join the 
coalition. Consequently, bundling won’t be utilized to prevent piracy. 
It should be noted that our results base on the assumption that both the hardware 
manufacturer and the software provider are monopoly. If there are two or more firms 
who produce homogeneous products in the market, price competition leads to zero 
profits. If firms are differentiated vertically, it will be difficult to set up consumers’ 
preference order. For example, if authorized product i is superior to authorized 
product j, then whether PI of ith product are inferior to jth authorized products or not 
is crucial for the analysis. Unfortunately, we do not have a judgment on preference 
order. As the number of firms increases, it becomes too complicated to analyze. 
Therefore, we assume one hardware manufacturer and one software provider in the 
model. Although this assumption is somewhat strong, it is still acceptable since in the 
realistic world, different brands of game consoles or software are reasonably 
differentiated in several dimensions, and thus firms have market power even though 
the inverse demand will become flatter due to competition. Hence, our analysis may 
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still work for explaining the change in region-code strategy adopted by the hardware 
manufacturer. 
The result of the model suggests that piracy is welfare improving for consumers. 
However, this result could only be true in a static model. In the present model, we 
show that piracy could sometimes be beneficial for the software provider; however, it 
is more common to see that the software firm suffers from piracy. In a dynamic model, 
even though consumers can be better off due to software piracy in the short run, 
piracy would be harmful for the software firm’s investment incentive in quality 
improvement or development of new software. As a consequence, with software 
piracy, the consumer’s welfare would decrease in the long run. 
As aforementioned, we adopt horizontal retail price arbitrage framework in our 
analysis. Parallel to the case of accommodating PI, applying our idea to vertical price 
control framework, we expect that the manufacturer will charge a higher wholesale 
price in country A and a lower wholesale price in country B to encourage PI and get 
benefits from price discrimination. Although we do not provide vertical price control 
model in the present paper, it will be interesting for future analysis. In addition, in this 
model, we assume the utility discount factor ሺ1 െ αሻ to be exogenous. Since α can 
be interpreted as the probability that a consumer needs after-sale service for the 
hardware, for future research, it would be interesting to endogenize this parameter.   
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Appendix 
A1. The derivation of c ൏ ߜ 
vଵ ൌ ୮౥PN
A ିሺୡିδሻ
α ൌ
αశౙషδ
మ ିሺୡିδሻ
α ൌ
ଵ
ଶ െ
ୡିஔ
ଶ஑  and vଶ ൌ
୮౞PNA ାୡିδ
ଵିఈ ൌ
భషαషౙశδ
మ ାୡିδ
ଵିఈ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ ൅
௖ିఋ
ଶሺଵିఈሻ. Since vଵ ൐ vଶ, we have 
ଵ
ଶ െ
ୡିஔ
ଶ஑ ൐
ଵ
ଶ ൅
௖ିఋ
ଶሺଵିఈሻ. This inequality is equivalent to 
ሺୡିஔሻሺଵି஑ሻା஑ሺୡିஔሻ
ଶ஑ሺଵି஑ሻ ൏ 0. Since α א ሺ0,1ሻ, the inequality can be reduced to  
ሺc െ δሻሺ1 െ αሻ ൅ αሺc െ δሻ ൏ 0, which is the inequality c ൏ ߜ. 
 
A2. The derivation of (3.14) 
UA ൌ ቐ
v െ p୦A െ p୭A
ሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦B െ t െ c ൅ δ0
  ;  UB ൌ ൜v െ p୦B െ p୭B0  
For simplicity, we ignore the subscript AP. A consumer with valuation vଵ in country 
A is indifferent between legitimate software and illegal software if vଵ െ p୦A െ p୭A ൌ
ሺ1 െ αሻvଵ െ p୦B െ t െ c ൅ δ . Solving for vଵ , we can say that consumers with 
v ൐ vଵ ൌ ୮O
Aା୮౞Aି୮౞Bି୲ିୡାδ
α  will purchase the authorized hardware and official 
software. Similarly, A consumer with valuation vଶ in country A will be indifferent 
between illegal software and no adoption if ሺ1 െ αሻv െ p୦B െ t െ c ൅ δ ൌ 0. Thus, 
vଶ ൌ ୮౞
Bା୲ାୡିδ
ଵିα . Consumers with valuation between vଶ and vଵwill purchase the PI 
hardware. The quantity demanded for the authorized hardware in country A can be 
calculated by ׬ 1dxଵ୴భ ൌ 1 െ
୮OAା୮౞Aି୮౞Bି୲ିୡାδ
α , while the quantity demanded for the PI 
91 
hardware is ׬ 1dx୴భ୴మ ൌ
୮OAା୮౞Aି୮౞Bି୲ିୡାδ
α െ
୮౞Bା୲ାୡିδ
ଵିα . Therefore, the profit of the 
hardware manufacturer is the sum of profit from authorized channels in both countries 
and the profit from PI. The profit from authorized channel in country B is shown in 
the benchmark, which is equal to p୦B൫1 െ p୭B െ p୦B൯. The profit from authorized 
channel in country A isp୦A ൬1 െ ୮O
Aା୮౞Aି୮౞Bି୲ିୡାδ
α ൰. The profit generated from PI is 
p୦B ൬୮O
Aା୮౞Aି୮౞Bି୲ିୡାδ
α െ
୮౞Bା୲ାୡିδ
ଵିα ൰. Summing these terms up leads to (3.14). 
 
A3. Country B won’t be the PI recipient country. 
Suppose that country B is the PI recipient country. The quantity demanded for the 
authorized hardware is ׬ 1dxଵ୴భB ൌ 1 െ
୮౞Bି୮౞Aି୲
஑ . Similarly, the quantity demanded for 
the PI hardware can be represented by ׬ 1dx୴భB୴మB ൌ
୮౞Bି୮౞Aି୲
஑ െ
୮౞Aା୲ା୮౥B
ଵି஑ . Since all 
buyers in country B purchase legitimate software, the quantity demanded for the 
software is ׬ 1dxଵ୴మB ൌ 1 െ
୮౞Aା୲ା୮౥B
ଵି஑ . 
 
The manufacturer faces the following profit maximization problem: 
 
max
൛୮౞A୮౞B,ൟ
π୦RF ൌ p୦B ቆ1 െ p୦
B െ p୦A െ t
α ቇ ൅ p୦
A ቆp୦
B െ p୦A െ t
α െ
p୦A ൅ t ൅ p୭B
1 െ α ቇ
൅ p୦A ቆ1 െ p୦
A ൅ c െ δ
1 െ α ቇ 
 
92 
where the superscript RF indicates region free. The first term is the profit from selling 
authorized products in country B. The second term is the profit from PI while the third 
term is the profit of authorized products in country A. The software provider’s profit 
maximization problem is now 
max
ሼ୮౥A,୮౥Bሽ
π୭RF ൌ p୭Bሺ1 െ p୦
A ൅ t ൅ p୭B
1 െ α ሻ ൅ p୭
Aሺ1 െ p୭
A െ c ൅ δ
α ሻ 
 
The first (second) term is the profit from country B (country A). 
 
Solving 4 first order conditions with respect to p୦A, p୦B, p୭A, and p୭B implies: 
p୦A ൌ ଷିଷ஑ିଶሺୡିஔሻି୲଻ , p୦B ൌ
଺ା஑ିସሺୡିஔሻାହ୲
ଵସ , p୭A ൌ
஑ାୡିஔ
ଶ , and p୭B ൌ
ଶିଶ஑ାሺୡିஔሻିଷ୲
଻   
Substituting p୦A , p୦B , p୭A , and p୭B  into vଵB  and vଶB  and imposing the assumption 
that vଵB ൐ vଶB , we have vଵB ൌ ୮౞
Bି୮౞Aି୲
஑ ൌ
లశಉషరሺౙషಌሻశఱ౪
భర ିሺ
యషయಉషమሺౙషಌሻష౪
ళ ା୲ሻ
஑ ൐ vଶB ൌ
୮౞Aା୲ା୮౥B
ଵି஑ ൌ
యషయಉషమሺౙషಌሻష౪
ళ ା୲ା
మషమಉశሺౙషಌሻషయ౪
ళ
ଵି஑ . Since α א ሺ0,1ሻ  and t ൒ 0 , solving the 
inequality yields c െ δ ൐ ଷ஑ሺଵି஑ሻା୲ሺ଻ି஑ሻଶ஑ ൐ 0 . This contradicts to the result that 
c െ δ ൏ 0, which has been proven in A1. 
 
A4. Bundling won’t be utilized to prevent piracy 
When both firms cooperate and offer a bundle of hardware and software, the 
equilibrium price of the bundle can be derived by solving the following profit 
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maximization problem: 
max୮ πBUሺpሻ ൌ pሺ1 െ pሻ 
The equilibrium price of the bundle is ଵଶ and joint profit is 
ଵ
ସ. Let s א ሾ0,1ሿ be the 
fraction of the joint profit that goes to the hardware manufacturer. When piracy exists, 
the hardware manufacturer would prefer to cooperate with the software firm if 
ሺଵିαିୡାδሻమ
ସሺଵିαሻ ൏
ୱ
ସ . Similarly, the software firm would prefer to offer a bundle by 
cooperating with the hardware firm if ሺαାୡିδሻ
మ
ସα ൏
ଵିୱ
ସ . Given α and ሺc െ δ), if we can 
find an s such that both inequalities hold, then cooperation can be the equilibrium. In 
other words, by definition of the core of a coalition game, the core is nonempty if 
ሺଵିαିୡାδሻమ
ସሺଵିαሻ ൏
ୱ
ସ  and 
ሺαାୡିδሻమ
ସα ൏
ଵିୱ
ସ  simultaneously hold. Accordingly, the core is 
nonempty if ሺଵିαିୡାδሻ
మ
ሺଵିαሻ ൏ ݏ ൏ 1 െ
ሺαାୡିδሻమ
α . However, this double inequality never 
holds since 1 െ ሺαାୡିδሻమα െ
ሺଵିαିୡାδሻమ
ሺଵିαሻ ൌ
ିሺୡିδሻమ
αሺଵିαሻ ൏ 0  for α א ሺ0,1ሻ , which is a 
contradiction to the condition for the core to exist. In other words, with 
aforementioned restrictions on parameters, the set ሼሺα, c െ δ, sሻ|ሼሺଵିαିୡାδሻమସሺଵିαሻ ൏
ୱ
ସሽ ת
ሼሺαାୡିδሻమସα ൏
ଵିୱ
ସ ሽሽ is empty suggesting that it is impossible to find a method to 
distribute the joint profit such that both firms agree to join the coalition and thus 
bundling won’t be adopted to prevent piracy.  
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CHAPTER IV 
MODES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: 
WHOLLY-OWNED OR JOINT VENTURE? FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE 
FROM TAIWANESE MULTINATIONAL MANUFACTURING 
ENTERPRISES 
 
1. Introduction 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection has been considered as an important 
factor for international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). How IPR protection 
affects international trade flows is still ambiguous. On one hand, some people believe 
that IPR protection can stimulate international trade flows due to the market 
expansion hypothesis, which claims that strengthening IPR may reduce imitation in 
the importing country and thus will encourage the IPR holder to export more. On the 
other hand, IPR protection may have negative effects on trade volume because of the 
market power effect and FDI. The market power hypothesis focuses on the IPR 
holder’s market power and claims that stronger IPR protection offers the IPR holder 
monopoly power and therefore it reduces volume of imports in the importing country. 
IPR protection may also be negatively correlated with trade volume because as IPR 
protection becomes sufficiently strong, IPR holders are more willing to substitute 
exporting by FDI. However, a very strong IPR system may also deter FDI since 
licensing would be a good alternative to FDI. Maskus (1998) finds that FDI is 
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sensitive to IPR protection. He uses U.S. annual data from 1989 to 1992 to show that 
by holding other things equal, if the extent of patent protection rises by 1 percent in 
the FDI recipient country, the stock of U.S. investment in that country increases by 
0.45 percent. Nicholson (2007) employs U.S data in 1995 and find evidence to 
support that stronger IPR leads to an increase in both FDI and licensing. Smith (2001) 
also finds that sales of U.S. affiliates and the strength of IPR protection in the host 
country are positively correlated. However, other studies such as Ferrantino (1993), 
Mansfield (1993), Maskus and Konan (1994) and Primo Braga and Fink (2000) do not 
find statistically significant evidence to support that argument. Thus, the overall 
relationship between IPR protection and FDI remains ambiguous. 
If we take a closer look at composition of FDI, IPR protection in the FDI host 
country plays a significant role for the MNEs on whether to invest in wholly owned 
subsidiaries or to enter joint ventures. Exploring the impact of IPR on FDI 
composition is interesting because it has important policy implications for developing 
countries. It is widely believed that joint ventures result in more technology spillovers 
to the host country than wholly owned subsidiaries do. Javorcik (2004a) and Javorcik 
and Spatareanu (2008) employ Lithuanian and Romanian data respectively to show 
that local participation plays an important role on technology spillovers from foreign 
direct investment. Maskus (1998) argues that to prevent its know-how from leakage to 
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a Southern firm, the IPR holder will engage in greenfield FDI if the host country has 
weak enforcement on IPR protection. Leahy and Naghavi (2010) develop a theoretical 
model to support this argument. They show that joint venture is the equilibrium 
market structure when IPR protection is stringent. Lee and Mansfield (1996) provide 
evidence from U.S. firms to show that a country’s system of IPR protection influences 
the volume and composition of FDI. They use data collected from almost 100 U.S. 
firms and conclude that stronger IPR protection in the host country has a positive 
effect on FDI volume. As for composition of FDI, they investigate data from 14 major 
U.S. chemical firms and find that MNEs tend to invest in wholly-owned subsidiaries 
if IPR protection is weaker in the host country. Javorcik (2004b) is another empirical 
study related to composition of FDI. She uses a unique data set collected from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union and finds that investors are more likely to engage 
in projects focusing on distribution rather than local production if the IPR protection 
is weak in the host country. These studies suggest that IPR protection in the host 
country is a significant determinant for FDI volume and composition. 
The deregulation of developing countries’ policy for inward FDI provides us a 
rationale to discuss the impact of IPR regime on MNE’s choice of ownership structure 
in the host country. So far, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
does not impose any restrictions on local equity requirement. However, since FDI has 
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been considered as an important channel for developing countries to absorb new 
technology, many developing countries deregulate their inward FDI restrictions. For 
example, Thailand has no restrictions on local equity requirement in principle, except 
for certain industries. For these industries, foreign firms still can apply for the 
approval by Board of Investment (BOI) to bypass local equity requirement. In 
Indonesia, the government imposed two restrictions before 1999. They were: first, the 
foreign firm’s equity share is not allowed to exceed 95% in a joint venture with a local 
firm. Second, a wholly owned foreign subsidiary must be transferred to a local firm 
within 15 years. However, both policies have been cancelled in 1999.  The Republic 
of Philippines has similar policy with Thailand. The Philippines government allows 
foreign firms to hold 100% equity share in principle, except for some specific 
industries. In Malaysia, 100% foreign ownership is permitted with some restrictions 
according to The Promotion of Investment Act of 1986. In 1998, regulation for 
foreign ownership of manufacturing industries is further relaxed. However, certain 
industries, such as paper, steel, printing, etc. are still under regulation. For China, let’s 
look at the summary provided by The US-China Business Council (USCBC, 2009): 
 
“On Nov. 7, 2007 the PRC National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
and Ministry of Commerce (NOFCOM) jointly issued the most recent version of the 
Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry. The catalogue is long-standing 
tool that PRC policymakers have used to manage and direct foreign investment. 
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Similar to the 2002 and 2004 editions, the 2007 catalogue divides industries into 
three basic categories: encouraged, restricted and prohibited. Industries not listed in 
the catalogue are generally open to foreign investment unless specifically barred in 
other PRC regulations. FIEs in encouraged industries are often permitted to establish 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs). They are also generally eligible for 
investment incentives, although China is currently adjusting many preferential 
policies for foreign investment, particularly tax-related policies. Industries in the 
restricted category may be limited to equity or contractual joint ventures, in some 
cases with the Chinese partner as the majority shareholder. Restricted category 
projects are also subject to higher government approvals. Industries in the prohibited 
section are closed to foreign investment.”   
 
USCBC also indicates that the number of items listed in the encouraged or 
permitted categories is far larger than the number in restricted and prohibited 
categories. The relaxing of local equity requirement for most industries in developing 
countries provides most Taiwanese MNEs freedom of choosing their ownership 
structure. And thus, we can further explore how IPR regime affects the ownership 
structure. 
Empirical studies that discuss the relationship between IPR protection and 
structures of foreign subsidiary ownership are surprisingly sparse. Javorcik and Saggi 
(2010) empirically test the relationship between technological asymmetry and entry 
mode of foreign investors. They find that foreign investors with more sophisticated 
technologies are less likely to choose joint ventures. However, they do not find 
evidence of IPR strength affecting the choice of entry mode by investigating the data 
from East European countries. Our study is another one that contributes to this topic. 
99 
The main concern of the present chapter is to examine whether Taiwanese 
multinational firms’ FDI mode (wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures) is 
sensitive to the degree of IPR protection in the host country. The main reason for 
studying Taiwanese MNEs is that more than 40% investors from Taiwan belong to the 
industry of Computer and Electronics, which is generally believed to be more 
sensitive to IPR protection. Table 4.1 provides the shares of investors for 4 industries 
from 2003 to 2005. In addition, around 70% Taiwanese MNEs choose China as the 
primary FDI host country. The IPR strength in China may play a significant role on 
Taiwanese MNE’s ownership structure. Figure 4.1 depicts the simple negative linear 
relationship between the share of wholly-owned subsidiaries and IPR strength in 
China from 2003 to 2005. It preliminarily suggests that MNEs might be more likely to 
choose joint ventures if IPR protection gets more stringent in the host country.  
 
Table 4.1 Shares of investors in each industry for the period 2003-2005 
Year 2003 2004 2005 
Industry 1 22.34% 23.85% 23.82% 
Industry 2 44.31% 42.49% 42.35% 
Industry 3 16.97% 18.12% 17.58% 
Industry 4 16.38% 15.55% 16.26% 
Note: The main industry categories are: 1) Metal, Machinery, and Transportation equipment; 2) 
Computer, Electronic parts and components, and Electrical machinery; 3) Chemical; 4) Food, 
Tobacco, Textile, Apparel, Wood and bamboo product, Furniture and fixture, and Non-metallic 
mineral products manufacturing. 
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We employ an unbalanced panel data set from Taiwanese manufacturing firms 
that have invested overseas.18 In contrast to Javorcik and Saggi (2010), our results 
show that the strength of IPR does have significant effect on Taiwanese MNEs’ choice 
of ownership structure of foreign subsidiaries. Firms tend to operate wholly owned 
subsidiaries in a country where IPR is weak and are more likely to participate in joint 
ventures if the host country has stringent IPR protection. This result is consistent to 
the prediction of our simple theoretical model. The key assumption in our theoretical 
model assumes that joint ventures will bring in more technology spillovers than 
wholly owned subsidiaries do. If IPR protection is weak, the multinational firms tend 
to invest in wholly owned subsidiaries to prevent its intellectual property from 
                                                      
18 This data set contains investors only and thus there might be sample-selection issues in MNE’s 
decision on investment location. We have the discussion regarding this problem in section 6. 
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leakage to a local firm. If IPR protection is sufficiently strong, the MNEs are more 
likely to participate in joint ventures to take the advantage of avoiding fixed cost for 
production in the local market and reducing the degree of competition by cooperating 
with a local firm. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
consideration of our empirical work. The econometric specification and the data are 
described in section 3. Section 4 demonstrates econometric approaches and concerns. 
The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 provides another empirical 
test and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Consideration 
Let’s consider a model that is similar to the framework in Leahy and Naghavi 
(2010). Introducing the theoretical consideration is helpful for understanding which 
variables are going to be included in the regression as well as expecting the direction 
of effects of the variables. Assume that there are N identical local firms in the host 
country competing in quantity with the MNE. The MNE has the same size with the 
local firms but with superior technology by engaging in cost-reducing R&D. The 
MNE can invest in the host country either by wholly-owned subsidiaries or by joint 
ventures. If the MNE invests in wholly-owned subsidiaries, it has to produce products 
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by incurring fixed cost F. On the other hand, the MNE can avoid the fixed cost by 
entering a joint venture with an existing local firm19. If the MNE chooses to operate a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, its profit is  
 
  πW ൌ p൫M, QW, ∑ q୧N୧ୀଵ ሺc෤൫T, SWሺμ, ιሻ൯ሻ൯QW െ CሺT, ηሻQW െ F    (4.1) 
 
The MNE’s profit when entering by joint ventures becomes 
 
  πJ ൌ ቆp ቆM, QJ, ∑ q୧Nିଵ୧ୀଵ ൬c෤ ቀT, SJሺμ, ιሻቁ൰ቇ QJ െ CሺT, ηሻQJቇ δ     (4.2) 
 
where the subscript W and J denote wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures 
respectively. 20 
p is the inverse demand function faced by the MNE and the local firms. Let M be 
the market size and Q denote quantity demanded for the MNE in the host country. 
q୧ሺ·ሻ is the quantity demanded for local firm i. Without loss of generality, we assume 
that the Nth local firm is the partner if joint venture is the equilibrium outcome. T 
                                                      
19 There might also exist some fixed cost for joint venture; however, it is generally small and can be 
ignored. 
20 We assume that there are fewer competitors in the market if an MNE chooses joint venture. If an 
MNE acquires a local firm, the advantage of reducing number of competitors in joint venture might be 
offset. However, we exclude the possibility of an MNE acquiring a local firm in the theoretical model 
since from our data, we can only know the ownership structure but do not have any information 
regarding acquisition. Nevertheless, number of competitors should still be (weakly) smaller in joint 
ventures. 
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measures the MNE’s technology intensity, which can be approximated by investment 
in R&D. The higher T is, the lower marginal cost will be. η denotes the price of 
production factors, such as labor cost in the host country. The technology spillover 
function Sሺμ, ιሻ ൒ 0  which is determined by two factors measures how much 
knowledge developed by the MNE unintentionally transfers to the local firms. A 
higher S leads to a smaller cost difference between the MNE and local firms since the 
marginal cost of the local firm decreases as knowledge leakage goes up. The first 
factor μ is local firms’ capability of technology absorption while the second factor ι 
represents the strength of intellectual property rights protection in the host country. μ 
measures how easy the local firms can learn and manipulate new technologies. In 
more specific term, if the local firms have higher μ, then they are more likely to 
successfully copy or imitate the sophisticated technology developed by the MNE. 
Therefore, it is natural to assume that μ is positively correlated with technology 
spillovers. However, on the other hand, stronger IPR protection raises the cost that the 
local firms need to pay to access the technology established by the MNE. Therefore, 
we will assume Sሺμ,ιሻபι ൏ 0.  c෤ሺT, Sሻ ൐ 0 defined by the marginal cost of the local 
outsider firm minus the marginal cost of the MNE is affected by T and S. For any 
given T ൐ 0 , we assume that technology spillover reduces the cost gap. i.e. 
பୡ෤ሺT,Sሻ
பS ൏ 0. In addition, as long as the technology is not fully copied by the local 
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outsider firm, c෤ is strictly increasing in T.  
SJሺμ, ιሻ ൐ SWሺμ, ιሻ ൐ 0 is a key assumption of the present study. This assumption is 
empirically supported by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008). It captures that joint 
ventures will result in much higher technology spillovers if IPR protection is not 
sufficiently strong. Since the MNE has better control on wholly-owned subsidiaries, 
technology spillovers are supposed to be less significant in this case than in joint 
ventures.21 Based on this assumption, it is natural to make another assumption that 
பSJሺμ,ιሻ
பι ൏
பSWሺμ,ιሻ
பι ൏ 0 . This inequality builds on the fact that marginal effect is 
decreasing. It is equivalent to saying that technology spillovers are more sensitive to 
IPR reform under joint ventures. Therefore, in summary, we have c෤ ቀT, SJሺμ, ιሻቁ ൏
c෤൫T, SWሺμ, ιሻ൯. 
Furthermore, if the MNE enters the host country by joint ventures, it maximizes 
joint profits with a fixed share of profits distributing to each partner. Let δ be the 
share going to the MNE. If δ is small, joint venture is not attractive for the MNE; 
however, if it is too large, the local firm will reject to participate in the joint venture. 
Therefore, the joint venture will occur only for medium value of δ. In other words, 
joint venture is the equilibrium ownership structure if  
 
                                                      
21 For simplicity, Leahy and Naghavi (2010) assume that technology spillover won’t occur if the MNE 
invests in wholly-owned subsidiaries. In our empirical study, this assumption is relaxed. 
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πJ ൐ πW subject to  
 
  ቆp ቆM, QJ, ∑ q୧Nିଵ୧ୀଵ ൬c෤ ቀT, SJሺμ, ιሻቁ൰ቇ QJ െ CሺT, ηሻQJቇ ሺ1 െ δሻ ൒  
  p ൬M, QW, ∑ q୧N୧ୀଵ ቀc෤൫T, SWሺμ, ιሻ൯ቁ൰ qN െ ሺCሺT, ηሻ ൅ c෤൫T, SWሺμ, ιሻ൯ሻqN  (4.3) 
 
The second inequality describes the condition for the local firm to participate in the 
joint venture. If it were violated, the local firm would prefer to stay as an outsider. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the MNE to choose wholly owned 
subsidiaries is πW ൐ πJ. Let the function φ be the difference of πW and πJ. Profit 
maximization in Cournot manner implies that φ ൌ φሺM, T, δ, η, μ, ι, Fሻ ൌ πW െ πJ . 
Our interest is the sign and magnitude of பφபι . Since 
பSሺμ,ιሻ
பι  and 
பୡ෤ሺT,Sሻ
பS  are both 
negative, we can derive பୡ෤பι ൐ 0. It means stronger IPR protection will increase the 
marginal cost gap between the insider and the outsider firms and thus it makes the 
market less competitive. Given a certain incremental level of IPR protection, since 
technology spillovers decrease more under joint ventures than under wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, the MNE can benefit more under the former than under the later as IPR 
protection becomes stronger. Therefore, joint ventures are more appealing as ι goes 
up, and we expect a negative sign for பφபι . In summary, the MNE is more likely to 
invest in joint ventures (wholly-owned subsidiaries) if the IPR protection gets more 
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(less) stringent.  
In addition to avoiding the fixed cost F, the joint venture has another benefit for 
the MNE. By cooperating with a local firm, the market in the host country becomes 
less competitive because there are fewer rivals in the market and that increases the 
MNE’s market power. However, if the technology spillover coming along with joint 
ventures is too high, the MNE and the local firms are more symmetric in marginal 
cost and the market becomes again competitive. Since c෤ is crucial for the MNE to 
determine the mode of entry, the technology intensity (T) of the MNE also plays a 
significant role. We can expect that joint ventures are less attractive for MNEs with 
higher T because the MNE and the local firms are more asymmetric in marginal cost. 
The advantage of reducing the number of competitors, which comes from joint 
ventures is more significant when the MNE and the local firms are more symmetric in 
marginal cost. An increase in c෤ due to an increase in T will make this advantage less 
significant to the MNE and thus we expect that பφபT ൐ 0. 
 
3. The Econometric Specification and Data 
The hypothesis we are going to test is whether the MNE is more likely to invest 
in wholly owned subsidiaries if the IPRs protection is weak. Let φ୧୲כ  be the profit 
difference of two investment alternatives, wholly owned subsidiaries and joint 
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ventures, faced by firm i in year t. Obviously, φ୧୲כ  is the firm’s private information 
which is unobservable. However, if φ୧୲כ ൐ 0, the MNE will decide to operate wholly 
owned subsidiaries. Otherwise, joint venture will be a best choice for entrance. What 
we can actually observe is whether the MNE firm invests in wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or in joint ventures22. Therefore, a binary outcome model is appropriate to 
test the hypothesis. 
Let’s consider the model: 
 
  φ୧୲ ൌ ቊ
1     if and only if  φ୧୲כ ൌ α୧ ൅ x୧୲′ β ൅ Ԗ୧୲ ൐ 0
0     if and only if  φ୧୲כ ൌ α୧ ൅ x୧୲′ β ൅ Ԗ୧୲ ൑ 0
      (4.4) 
where x୧୲ is the vector of independent variables, while α୧ represents the unobserved 
individual specific effect. Since φ୧୲כ  is not observable, equation 4.4 is also called a 
latent variable model. 
 
Therefore, we will estimate the following model 
 
  φ୧୲ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵlnGDP୧୲ ൅ βଶlnPGDP୧୲ ൅ βଷlnRDINT୧୲ ൅ βସlnEMP୧୲  
      ൅βହSS୧୲ ൅ β଺ሺSS୧୲ሻଶ ൅ β଻TA୧୲ ൅ β଼TR୧୲ ൅ βଽIPR୧୲ ൅ βଵ଴LANG୧୲    (4.5) 
      ൅βଵଵCORR୧୲ ൅ γ୧୲ID୧୲ ൅ θ୧୲PD୧୲ ൅ Ԗ୧୲  
                                                      
22 We do not consider other choice such as exporting to the country because of the data limitation. The 
data limitation will be discussed later. 
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We employ an unbalanced panel data set from 2003 to 2005. There are 1880, 
1711, and 1667 observations for 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. The dependent 
variable comes from the annual survey conducted by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA) of Taiwan. Each year, a short questionnaire is sent to Taiwanese 
manufacturing firms that have invested abroad. Each firm is required to pick up one 
foreign country/region where it primarily invested and the structure of ownership of 
its subsidiary from the questionnaire. The dependent variable equals unity if the 
subsidiary in the FDI host country is wholly owned by the MNE; otherwise, it takes 
the value zero.23 However, since the respondents in this survey are limited to firms 
that have invested abroad, we can’t take other entry mode such as direct exporting and 
licensing into consideration. This data can only reveal the choice of ownership 
structure (wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures) in the FDI host country and 
thus we will focus our analysis on the mode of FDI rather than mode of entry. There 
are 19 countries/regions that can be circled on the questionnaire.24 The measure of 
IPR protection in each country/region can be obtained from the Global 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF). The IPR index of 
                                                      
23 We follow Álvarez (2003) and define the mode of FDI as either wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint 
ventures. For a partially-owned subsidiary, it is classified as joint ventures. This classification is not 
harmful for our analysis since similar to the case of joint ventures, knowledge leakage is also higher for 
partially-owned subsidiaries. 
24 The 19 countries/regions include United States, Canada, Mexico, Latin America, West Europe, East 
Europe, Hong Kong, China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, 
South Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Africa, and other region not listed.  
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WEF is between 1 (weak or nonexistence) and 7 (equal to the world’s most stringent). 
A higher score indicates a stronger level of IPR protection. This index has been 
widely used in many studies, such as Yang and Huang (2009), Nunnenkamp and Spatz 
(2004), Wu (2009), the annual report of the Economic Freedom of the World Index 
conducted by Fraser Institute (FI) and so on. In our study, the IPR index of a region is 
calculated by the average of IPR index of each member country in the region. We pick 
up values from 101 countries for all years (2004, 2005, and 2006) to make the index 
consistent and comparable across years even though there are more countries listed on 
some WEF reports25. To measure the market size of the host country, lnGDP, 
representing GDP (in billions) in logarithm is adopted. GDP per capita in natural 
logarithm, denoted by lnPGDP, is used as a control variable. As stated in Javorcik 
(2004b), countries with higher lnPGDP tend to have higher factor price. On the 
demand side, it can also stand for average income in the host country. We collect 
lnGDP and lnPGDP from World Economic Outlook Database (WEO) developed by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). lnEMP, the number of employees of a firm in 
natural logarithm, measures the firm size. lnRDINT represents R&D intensity in 
natural logarithm. The data for R&D intensity come from MOEA, which is calculated 
by R&D expenditure of a firm divided by the number of employees in that firm. The 
                                                      
25 The Global Competitiveness Report (2004) contains 104 countries; however, Angola and Zambia are 
dropped in the report of 2005 while Ghana is excluded from the report of 2006. Therefore, we only use 
the data from 101 countries for the given time span. 
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variable LANG is a dummy variable which equals one if the FDI host country and 
Taiwan share the same official language, which is Chinese. Therefore, LANG equals 
one for China and Hong Kong26. The coefficient of LANG is expected to be positive 
since if language is a barrier (LANG=0), investors tend to find a local partner (ψ=0) 
to handle communication in the host country. CORR is a measure for business costs 
of corruption. This index obtained from WEF ranges from 1 (impose large costs) to 7 
(impose no costs). The higher CORR is, the more transparent the government is. We 
will expect that firms are more likely to participate in joint ventures if corruption in 
the host country is more serious because a local partner has better understanding 
about the local government. Therefore, a positive coefficient of CORR is expected. 
ID୧୲ is a set of dummy variables for 4 industry classifications of the parent enterprises. 
The purpose of adding ID୧୲ in the regression is to control for specific characteristics 
of each industry. The bargain power δ is approximated by sales share of the firm 
within each industry category since δ ranges between 0 and 1. A firm with higher 
sales share is expected to have higher bargain power. There are 4 main industry 
classifications and 4 subcategories27. In other words, we have 16 combinations of 
industry categories. Thus, SS, the sales share for a particular firm, is calculated by the 
                                                      
26 Taiwan and Hong Kong use traditional Chinese while China uses simplified Chinese. They are 
slightly different but should not be considered as a language barrier. 
27 The main industry categories include: 1) Metal, Machinery, and Transportation equipment; 2) 
Computer, Electronic parts and components, and Electrical machinery; 3) Chemical; 4) Food, Tobacco, 
Textile, Apparel, Wood and bamboo product, Furniture and fixture, and Non-metallic mineral products 
manufacturing. The sub category includes: 1) Resource Light Industry; 2) Processing Light Industry 3) 
Resource Heavy Industry; and 4) Processing Heavy Industry. 
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sales of the firm divided by total sales of Taiwanese firms in the same industry. That is, 
SS୧୨ ൌ ୱୟ୪ୣୱ౟ౠ∑ ୱୟ୪ୣୱ౟ౠ౟ , where i is the i
th Taiwanese firm in category j. To capture the nonlinear 
influence on structure of ownership, we add a square term of SS in the regression. TA 
stands for firm-level technology absorption, which measures how aggressive firms in 
a particular country absorb new technology. This firm-level index ranging from 1 (not 
interested in absorbing new technology) to 7 (aggressive in absorbing new technology) 
can be obtained from WEF. Technological readiness (TR) collected from WEF 
measures a country’s technological level. It also ranges from 1 (generally lags behind 
most other countries) to 7 (among those of the world leaders).  
One may argue that the project type of the subsidiary (distribution or production) 
could be a significant factor for the MNE to choose its structure of ownership because 
local production will generate higher technology spillovers and thus investors are 
more likely to engage in greenfield investment to undertake projects focusing on local 
production. Therefore, we add a dummy PD୧୲  that equals 1 if the subsidiary 
undertakes production project and 0 if it focuses on distribution to check if IPR is still 
robust in our analysis. Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics and data sources of 
all variables. 
 
 
112 
Table 4.2 Variable definition, basic statistics and data source 
Variable Definition Mean 
Standard
deviation Data source 
φ A binary variable. It equals 1 
 if the subsidiary is wholly 
  owned by the MNE; 0 if 
  joint venture. 
0.6599 0.4738 Ministry of Economic  
Affairs, Taiwan 
IPR The degree of IPR protection 
  of the host country. The  
higher the index is, the 
  stronger the protection is. 
3.7953 0.9502 The Global 
Competitiveness Report, 
World Economic  
Forum 
lnGDP GDP of the host country on in 
 logarithm. (in billions of 
 US dollars) 
7.2291 1.1760 IMF World Economic  
Outlook Database 
lnPGDP GDP per capita of the host 
  country in logarithm. 
 (in thousands of US dollars) 
0.8549 1.2363 Derived from IMF World 
Economic Outlook  
Database &  
UNFPA State of World 
Population 
CORR A measurement of corruption 
 in the host country. The 
  higher, the more transparent 
  the government is. 
4.4847 0 .7174 The Global  
Competitiveness Report, 
World Economic 
Forum 
TA Firm-level technology 
  absorption. The higher, the 
  more aggressive in absorbing new 
technology. 
5.2042 0.4038 The Global  
Competitiveness Report,
World Economic 
Forum 
TR Technology readiness. The 
  higher this index is, the 
  higher technology level the 
  country has. 
4.0099 0.9610 The Global  
Competitiveness Report, 
World Economic 
Forum 
SS Sales share of the parent 
  enterprise. 
0.0072 0.0414 Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
lnRDINT R&D intensity in logarithm, 
  measured by R&D 
  expenditure per employee. 
-0.0228 6.1349 Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
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lnEMP Number of employees in 
  logarithm. 
5.5322 1.5539 Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
LANG A dummy that equals 1 if the 
  host country and Taiwan 
  share common official 
  language. 
0 .7539 0 .4308 Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs, Taiwan 
ID1 Industry dummy variable for 
  the parent enterprises.  
(Metal & Machinery) 
0 .2330 0 .4228 Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
ID2 Industry dummy variable for 
  the parent enterprises. 
(Computer & Electronics) 
0 .4310 0 .4953 Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
ID3 Industry dummy variable for 
  the parent enterprises. 
(Chemical) 
0 .1754 0 .3803 Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
PD Production dummy equals 1 if 
  project type of the subsidiary  
  is production. 
0.8718 0 .3343 Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
The mean and standard deviation are calculated based on pooling data for 2003-2005. 
 
4. Econometric Theory 
In this section, we provide a short review on econometric theory regarding panel 
discrete choice model. Given (4.1), 
Prሾy୧୲ ൌ 1|x୧୲ሿ ൌ Prሾα୧ ൅ x୧୲ᇱ β ൅ Ԗ୧୲ ൐ 0ሿ ൌ Pr ሾെԖ୧୲ ൏ α୧ ൅ x୧୲ᇱ βሿ ൌ Fሺα୧ ൅
x୧୲ᇱ βሻ, where F(．) is a cumulative distribution function of െԖ, which is equal to the 
cdf of Ԗ provided that the density of Ԗ is symmetric about 0. In common cases, F is 
assumed to take the form of the standard normal or logistic cdf. If F is the standard 
normal cdf, then this model is called the probit model. If F is logistic cdf, which takes 
the form FሺԖሻ ൌ e஫/1 ൅ e஫, then this model is called the logit model.  
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A pooled regression specifies constant coefficients and thus α୧ ൌ α for all units. 
However, in a more general model, when individual-specific effects are considered, 
each cross-sectional unit is allowed to have a different intercept. In other words, the 
intercept term, α୧ varies across the cross-sectional units but is constant across time. 
In addition, α୧ may or may not be correlated with x୧୲. If α୧ is correlated with x୧୲, 
the model is called a fixed effect model; while a random effect model assumes that α୧ 
and x୧୲ are uncorrelated.  
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) point out that pool estimation ignores individual 
specific effects, and therefore, the estimates in the pooled model are generally 
inconsistent. To solve this problem, the fixed effect and random effect models are 
adopted instead. However, fixed effect specification is generally not applicable to 
nonlinear panel models. Neyman and Scott (1948) argue that maximum likelihood 
method fails to estimate the coefficients consistently in nonlinear panel fixed effect 
model due to incidental parameters problem, which arises when the length of the 
panel is small and fixed. To solve the incidental parameters problem, Neyman and 
Scott (1948) propose a general principle to find a consistent estimator of β. They 
suggest to find K functions  
GN୨ሺyଵ, … , yN|βሻ,      j ൌ 1, … , K 
that are independent of α୧  and have the property that GN୨ሺyଵ, … , yN|βሻ P՜ 0  as 
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N ՜ ∞. However, it is model-specific and generally difficult to find such functions. In 
particular, for fixed effect probit model, there does not exist such functions and thus 
we don’t have consistent estimators in fixed effect probit model (Hsiao, 1986). 
 Similar problem arises in fixed effect logit model. The conditional likelihood 
approach suggested by Andersen (1970, 1973) is applied to the binary choice logit 
model to obtain consistent estimators for the structural parameter β. However, this 
approach discards observations that are time invariant and thus it is less efficient. The 
efficiency loss in fixed effect logit model is typically large especially for binary 
choice panel data. 
 Alternatively, in the random effect model, the logit and probit have little 
difference between the predicted probabilities except in the tails where probabilities 
are closed to 0 or 1 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). However, as stated in Maddala 
(1987), the logit model is somewhat more restrictive since it is derived from the 
multivariate logistic distribution, (which is more restrictive than the normal 
distribution), and therefore, the probit model is more popular in the random effect 
model. The random effect probit model assumes α୧~Nሺ0, σαଶሻ, Ԗ୧୲~Nሺ0, σ஫ଶሻ, and 
both of them are mutually independent and are independent of x୧୲ as well. Given the 
property of mutual independence, by conditioning on α୧, the joint density function 
can be decomposed so that the joint probability is simplified and the log-likelihood 
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function only involves a single integration over α୧. Therefore, the corresponding 
estimator becomes computationally feasible by the method of Butler and Moffitt 
(1982). For the details, the derivation of the log-likelihood function in random effect 
probit model is provided in the appendix. 
 In short, we will focus our empirical results from random effect probit model for 
the following reasons: 1) the pooled estimation is generally inconsistent. 2) the fixed 
effect model is inconsistent due to incidental parameters problem. Although a 
consistent estimator is available by conditional likelihood approach in a binary fixed 
effect logit model, it is less efficient because it may not contain time invariant 
variables. 3) in a random effect model, the probit model is less restrictive than the 
logit model. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 4.3 demonstrates the estimation results. Random effect models for panel 
logit and probit model are shown in column 1 and column2 respectively. Column 3 
represents the result for fixed effect panel logit model. Please note that the fixed effect 
specification for panel probit model is not applicable as we describe in section 4. 
Column 4 and column 5 provide the result of pooled model (or population-averaged, 
PA) for logit and probit specification respectively. Given our data set, we lost 79.8% 
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of our sample (4194 out of 5258) in fixed effect model since it drops individuals that 
do not change over time. In other words, fixed effect logit model has big efficiency 
loss. For pooled model, as aforementioned, since this specification ignores individual 
specific effects, the estimates in the pooled model are generally inconsistent. 
Therefore, even though all specifications reveal that the choice of ownership structure 
is significantly affected by strength of IPR protection, our discussion will focus on the 
results obtained from random effect probit model, which is shown in column 2.  
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Table 4.3 Panel Binary Outcomes Estimation Results  
Dependent variable: φ ; Number of firms: (1880, 1711, 1667) in year (2003, 2004, 2005) 
Model Logit RE Probit RE Logit FE Logit PA Probit PA
IPR index -0.99011 ** -0.57471 ** -1.13646 ** -0.42451 ** -0.25905 **
(0.42356) (0.241859) (0.485609) (0.169692) 
 
(0.103699)
R&D intensity (in log) 0.039061 *** 0.021976 *** -0.01616 0.013905 *** 0.008715 ***
(0.013559) (0.007694) (0.018953) (0.005494) 
 
(0.00336)
Number of employees 0.269237 *** 0.151312 *** 0.007007 0.10483 *** 0.063943 ***
(0.058621) (0.033324) (0.086981) (0.024314) 
 
(0.014694)
Corruption 0.252568 0.148497 0.202266 0.101343 
 
0.066786
(0.201562) (0.114668) (0.223001) (0.076988) (0.04665)
Technology absorption -0.35862 -0.19981 -0.9977 -0.06416 -0.04564
(0.4294) (0.242384) (0.56914) (0.169873) (0.104952)
Technological readiness 0.152648 0.093605 0.709971 0.025326 0.017748
(0.543967) (0.309105) (0.643487) (0.21839) (0.133902)
Sales share -8.19536 * -4.59855 * -2.77996 -2.38619 
 
-1.47265
(4.917439) (2.768245) (9.072037) (1.828565) 
 
(1.125431)
Squared sales share  8.404584 4.70891 8.60741 2.252468 
 
1.352059
(8.258872) (4.616321) (19.85651) (2.60342) 
 
(1.581394)
GDP (in log) 0.168304 ** 0.094325 ** -0.01326 0.059213 * 0.035931 * 
(0.084251) (0.047977) (0.115606) (0.034288) 
 
(0.020796)
GDP per capita (in log) 0.571986 *** 0.32437 *** 0.569714 *** 0.25147 *** 0.152427 ***
(0.177446) (0.100667) (0.201845) (0.078426) 
 
(0.047797)
Language 0.831141 *** 0.465081 *** 0.35361 0.326292 *** 0.201045 ***
(0.283142) (0.160704) (0.405124) (0.11468) (0.069819)
Production Dummy -0.0432 -0.02407 0.066165 -0.03578 
 
-0.02313
(0.233429) (0.132933) (0.2809) (0.100293) 
 
(0.060825)
Industry dummy1 
(Metal & Machinery) 
-0.00174 0.002112 2.820932 ** 0.05192 
 
0.031773
(0.309887) (0.175434) (1.249336) (0.141698) 
 
(0.087517)
Industry dummy2 
(Computer & Electronics) 
1.554227 *** 0.875886 *** 1.39503 0.551517 *** 0.333886 ***
(0.297548) (0.171064) (1.032879) (0.143283) 
 
(0.087615)
Industry dummy3 
(Chemical) 
-0.13862 -0.07582 0.133489 0.045384 0.024597
(0.32217) (0.182211) (0.798529) (0.144094) (0.088991)
Constant 1.331878 0.740745 0.468729 0.286827
(1.75371) (0.994601) (0.771173) (0.472558)
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Log-Likelihood -2606.75 -2608.01 -371.01
LR test (P-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0231 0.0000 0.0000
The dependent variable equals one if the MNE invests in wholly owned subsidiaries and zero if  
the MNE participates in joint ventures. *** Denotes significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. For PA model, since there are only 3 periods, we do not place  
any restrictions on the error correlation. 
 
Table 4.4 provides the marginal effects based on our estimation. Please note that 
the marginal effect measures the slope of the probability function. The slope could be 
greater than 1 even though the function is between 0 and 1. The slope is generally 
interpreted in economics as the change in the dependant variable due to one unit 
change in the independent variable. However, this interpretation is just an 
approximation of the slope. The coefficient of IPR in the probit model is negatively 
significant and is estimated to be -0.57 suggesting that the marginal effect of IPR is 
around -0.135, which approximately indicates that cēterīs paribus, one unit increase 
in IPR strength in the average country will reduce the probability of operating 
wholly-owned subsidiaries by 13.5%.2829  
 
 
                                                      
28 Another way to interpret the coefficient is as follows. In our latent variable model, φ୧୲כ ൌ α୧ ൅
x୧୲ᇱ β ൅ Ԗ୧୲, β can be directly interpreted as the incremental level in the profit difference due to an 
increase in the regressor. For example, the coefficient of IPR means that an increase in the strength of 
IPR protection is predicted to reduce the profit difference by 0.57 standard deviation.   
29 We can imagine that one unit increase in IPR strength in the average country is the incremental 
change in IPR strength from Chile to Taiwan. 
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Table 4.4 Marginal Effect (Panel Probit Random Effect Model)
Independent Variables Marginal Effect 
IPR index -0.1354291 
R&D intensity (in log) 0.0051785 
Number of employees 0.0356565 
Corruption 0.0349932 
Technology absorption -0.0470855 
Technological readiness 0.0220579 
Sales share -1.083644 
Squared sales share 1.109649 
GDP (in log) 0.0222275 
GDP per capita (in log) 0.0764374 
Language 0.1226559 
Production Dummy -0.0056191 
(Metal & Machinery) 0.0004973 
(Computer & Electronics) 0.1945932 
(Chemical) -0.0183192 
 
A significantly positive coefficient of R&D intensity in logarithm implies that 
firms whose R&D expenditure per employee is higher are less likely to participate in 
joint ventures. This result is consistent to the finding of Javorcik and Saggi (2010) 
who claim that firms with more sophisticated technologies prefer wholly owned 
subsidiaries to joint ventures. However, in our study, the marginal effect of R&D 
intensity is around 0.005, which is pretty small. It means even though the coefficient 
is statistically significant, a one-percent increase in R&D expenditure per employee 
will raise the probability of wholly owned subsidiaries by only 0.5 percent. We obtain 
a positive coefficient on firm size which is measured by number of employees in 
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logarithm. As Blomström and Zejan (1991) suggested, this result shows that lager 
firms are more willing to invest in wholly owned subsidiaries. The marginal effect of 
firm size implies that when number of employees increases by 1%, the probability of 
operating wholly owned subsidiaries will rise by 3.5 percent. A negative coefficient 
on sales share and a positive coefficient on squared sales share (though the later is 
insignificant) jointly suggest that joint ventures are more likely to occur for 
intermediate bargain power, which is approximated by sales share of the MNE. If the 
bargain power is too low, the MNE will reject to engage in joint ventures; if the 
bargain power of the MNE is sufficiently strong, no local firms will enter the joint 
venture. Market size has a positive effect on the choice of wholly owned subsidiaries 
since the coefficient of GDP in logarithm is positive and significant. The marginal 
effect suggests that Taiwanese MNEs will increase the probability of investing in 
wholly owned subsidiaries by 2.2 percent if the GDP in the host country increases by 
1%. The coefficient of GDP per capita in logarithm is also significantly positive. 
Since, on the supply side, GDP per capita often reflects factor price in the host country, 
when production cost is sufficiently high, other things being equal, firms’ profitability 
decreases and thus technology spillovers caused by joint ventures become intolerable. 
On the demand side, high lnPGDP also stands for high average income, which can be 
approximated as willingness to pay (WTP) of the consumers in the host country. Our 
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estimation indicates that 1% increase in GDP per capita raises the probability of 
wholly owned subsidiaries by 7.6 percent. Language is another significant factor that 
determines the choice of entry. A positive coefficient is obtained as expected. The 
marginal effect suggests that Taiwanese MNEs investing in countries which share 
common languages with Taiwan have on average 12.3% higher probability in 
choosing wholly-owned subsidiaries. Industry dummies for the parent enterprises 
indicate that firms belonging to computer and electronics industry prefer setting up 
wholly owned subsidiaries. The marginal effect shows that by controlling other 
variables, the probability of choosing wholly owned subsidiaries by firms in the 
computer and electronics industry is 19.5% higher than firms in other industries.  A 
possible explanation for this result is that firms in the computer and electronics 
category are more sensitive to its intellectual property and thus joint ventures are less 
attractive to these firms. 
Another concern may arise on whether the ownership structure is sensitive to 
characteristics of the industry where the local subsidiary belongs. To control for this, 
we add dummies (SID) that specify the industry where the local subsidiaries belong to 
control for industrial specific characteristics. Table 4.5 describes the 34 dummy 
variables we add.  
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Table 4.5: Definition of Industry Dummy for Foreign Subsidiaries 
Dummy Variable Definition 
SID01 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Animal Husbandry 
SID02 Mining and Quarrying 
SID03 Food Products and Beverages Manufacturing 
SID04 Tobacco Manufacturing 
SID05 Textile Mill Products 
SID06 Wearing Apparel, Accessories and Other Textile Products Manufacturing 
SID07 Leather, Fur and Products Manufacturing 
SID08 Wood and Bamboo Products 
SID09 Furniture and Fixtures Manufacturing 
SID10 Pulp, Paper and Paper Products Manufacturing 
SID11 Printing Processes 
SID12 Chemical Material Manufacturing 
SID13 Chemical Products Manufacturing 
SID14 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 
SID15 Rubber Products Manufacturing 
SID16 Plastic Products Manufacturing 
SID17 Non-metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing 
SID18 Basic Metal Industries 
SID19 Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing 
SID20 Machinery and Equipments Manufacturing and Repairing 
SID21 Computers, Electronic and Optical Products 
SID22 Electronic Parts and Components 
SID23 Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing and Repairing 
SID24 Transport Equipments Manufacturing and Repairing 
SID25 Precision Instruments Manufacturing 
SID26 Other Industrial Products Manufacturing 
SID27 Buildings Construction 
SID28 Wholesale and Retail Trade 
SID29 Accommodation and Food Services 
SID30 Warehousing and Storage 
SID31 Finance and Insurance 
SID32 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 
SID33 Consultation Services 
SID34 Others 
Source: Survey on Taiwanese manufacturing firms’ outward investment (MOEA). 
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The equation we are going to estimate becomes 
 
  φ୧୲ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵlnGDP୧୲ ൅ βଶlnPGDP୧୲ ൅ βଷlnRDINT୧୲ ൅ βସlnEMP୧୲  
      ൅βହSS୧୲ ൅ β଺ሺSS୧୲ሻଶ ൅ β଻TA୧୲ ൅ β଼TR୧୲ ൅ βଽIPR୧୲ ൅ βଵ଴LANG୧୲    (4.6) 
      ൅βଵଵCORR୧୲ ൅ γ୧୲ID୧୲ ൅ θ୧୲PD୧୲ ൅ Ԃ୧୲SID୧୲ ൅ Ԗ୧୲   
 
We present the estimation results for different model specifications in table 4.6. 
As we stated above, fixed effect for panel probit model is not available and the fixed 
effect specification for panel logit model is not appropriate since it results in 79.8% 
loss of our sample. IPR is still robust for all model specifications. Among the new 
dummy variables we add in this regression, random effect specification shows that 
only the coefficient of the dummy that represents paper industry is negatively 
significant. All other dummies we add in this section are insignificant. This result 
suggests that Taiwanese MNEs tend to participate in joint ventures in paper industry.  
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Table 4.6 Panel Binary Outcomes Estimation Results (SID added) 
Dependent variable: φ ; Number of firms: (1880, 1711, 1667) in year (2003, 2004, 2005) 
Model Logit RE Probit RE Logit FE Logit PA Probit PA 
IPR index -1.14053 ** -0.64993 ** -1.31127 ** -0.42451 ** -0.25905 **
(0.440982) (0.251295) (0.53516) (0.169692) 
 
(0.103699)
R&D intensity (in log) 0.039166 *** 0.022042 *** -0.01374 0.013905 ** 0.008715 ***
(0.013994) (0.007923) (0.019936) (0.005494) 
 
(0.00336)
Number of employees 0.262939 *** 0.147704 *** -0.01153 0.10483 *** 0.063943 ***
(0.060175) (0.034164) (0.093835) (0.024314) (0.014694)
Corruption 0.257873 0.150324 0.194141 0.101343 0.066786
(0.205832) (0.116853) (0.234692) (0.076988) (0.04665)
Technology absorption -0.20605 -0.11517 -0.95513 -0.06416 -0.04564
(0.440955) (0.248126) (0.601159) (0.169873) (0.104952)
Technological readiness 0.173342 0.101128 0.98983 0.025327 0.017748
(0.559107) (0.31696) (0.68068) (0.21839) (0.133902)
Sales share -6.68021 -3.68172 -3.28779 -2.38619 -1.47265
(5.033689) (2.828575) (10.11534) (1.828565) (1.125431)
Squared sales share  6.901901 3.779257 9.674848 2.252468 1.352059
(8.385045) (4.679484) (23.14136) (2.60342) (1.581394)
GDP (in log) 0.152745 * 0.084313 * -0.0992 0.059213 * 0.035931 * 
(0.086421) (0.049107) (0.125083) (0.034288) 
 
(0.020796)
GDP per capita (in log) 0.630942 *** 0.354477 *** 0.520663 ** 0.25147 *** 0.152427 ***
(0.199979) (0.113186) (0.243243) (0.078426) 
 
(0.047797)
Language 0.872085 *** 0.486497 *** 0.641313 0.326292 *** 0.201045 ***
(0.291351) (0.164996) (0.425102) (0.11468) (0.069819)
Production Dummy -0.04549 -0.0197 0.147507 -0.03578 
 
-0.02313
(0.245817) (0.139367) (0.302524) (0.100293) 
 
(0.060825)
Industry dummy1 0.082128 0.049519 2.968503 ** 0.05192 
 
0.031773
(Metal & Machinery) (0.376653) (0.212707) (1.326715) (0.141698) 
 
(0.087517)
Industry dummy2 1.360139 *** 0.760597 *** 1.355253 0.551517 *** 0.333886 ***
(Computer & Electronics) (0.372159) (0.212475) (1.066715) (0.143283) 
 
(0.087615)
Industry dummy3 0.058291 0.028958 0.079107 0.045384 
 
0.024597
(Chemical) (0.373357) (0.209909) (0.885561) (0.144094) 
 
(0.088991)
SID 10 -2.31709 ** -1.30674 ** -2.15439 -0.81869 ** -0.49677 **
(Pulp & Paper) (1.109235) (0.621676) (1.646201) (0.402065) 
 
(0.247276)
 
126 
SID 13 -0.82023 -0.46129 -2.1256 * -0.30237 
 
-0.17765
(Petroleum & Coal) (0.931534) (0.527541) (1.265343) (0.357034) 
 
(0.219346)
Constant 1.239765 0.690054 0.513458 
 
0.286827
(1.998481) (1.13275) (0.687398) 
 
(0.472558)
Log-Likelihood -2581.83 -2583.25 -348.056
LR test P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000
The dependent variable equals one if the MNE invests in wholly owned subsidiaries and zero if  
the MNE participates in joint ventures. *** Denotes significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. SIDs except for SID10 and SID13 are not listed on this table 
because none of them are significant in any model. 
 
6. Robustness Test 
To check if IPR is a robust determinant for the structure of ownership, we use the 
share of Taiwanese MNEs operating wholly owned subsidiaries in country/region k in 
year t as the dependent variable. The share SW௞௧ calculated from the same data set is 
defined by total number of MNEs that invest in wholly owned subsidiaries in one 
country/region divided by total number of Taiwanese MNEs that invest in that 
country/region. Thus, there are 19 observations each year. We run the following 
regression: 
 
  SW௞௧ ൌ ρ଴ ൅ ρଵIPR௞௧ ൅ ρଶCORR௞௧ ൅ ρଷlnPGDP௞௧ ൅ ρସlnGDP௞௧  
        ൅ρହTA௞௧ ൅ ρ଺TR௞௧ ൅ ρ଻LANG௞௧ ൅ ω௞௧         (4.7) 
where k =1,2,…,19 and ω௞௧ is the white noise disturbance term.  
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The independent variables are defined in the previous section. The dependent 
variable ranges between 0 and 1; this suggests that a 2-sided panel tobit model is 
appropriate for the estimation. The result is summarized in column 1 of table 4.7. The 
coefficient of IPR is still negative though it is insignificant. One problem of this 
regression may arise when sample sizes are quite asymmetric across regions. If 
identical weight is placed on each region, the influence of certain regions with small 
sample size will be overestimated.30 To correct this problem, two alternatives are 
employed. The first approach is that we use the average number of firms investing in 
region k for the period 2003-2005 as the importance weight.31 The second approach 
is dropping those regions where SW equals 0 or 1 in any year. The reason for adopting 
the second approach is that if SW reaches 0 or 1 for one region, it is because the 
sample size in that region is too small.32 Dropping those outliers can correct the 
“equal weights problem” stated above. The results for first and second approach are 
shown in column 2 and 3 of table 4.7 respectively. The coefficients of IPR in column 
2 and 3 are both significantly negative. Both estimates indicate that foreign ownership 
structure is sensitive to IPR protection. MNEs are more likely to participate in joint 
                                                      
30 For example, for some regions such as Canada and Mexico, number of investors is pretty small. 
Both Canada and Mexico have only 2 establishments, while there are 1217 establishments in China in 
2005. 
31 For example, the numbers of firms investing in United States in 2003, 2004 and 2005 are 174, 131 
and 122 respectively. The weight for United States is given by the mean of (174, 131, 122), which is 
142.33. 
32 Given our data set, the regions that are discarded contain less than 9 observations (for three years). 
In other words, on average, only 3 or fewer firms invest in the discarded region. 
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ventures if IPR protection is strong in the FDI host country. 
Table 4.7 Two-sided Panel Tobit Regression 
Model       I         II       III 
IPR index -0.1597856 -0.0451821 *** -0.1301173 ** 
(0.131205) (0.0053904) (0.0562669) 
 
GDP (in log) 0.0151928 0.0281653 *** 0.0313194 ** 
(0.0256728) (0.0010269) (0.0139233) 
 
GDP per capita (in log) 0.1142281 ** 0.064436 *** 0.1309951 ***
(0.0604802) (0.002293) (0.0367468) 
 
Corruption -0.0106868 0.0241554 *** 0.0024332 
 
(0.1019765) (0.0024622) (0.043416) 
 
Technological readiness 0.0780861 -0.0623922 *** -0.0390632 
 
(0.112445) (0.0067114) (0.0556597) 
 
Technology absorption -0.0090037 0.0492649 *** 0.0188113 
 
(0.0976251) (0.0053349) (0.0520395) 
 
Language 0.138418 0.0881866 *** 0.1205853 ** 
(0.1096008) (0.0033948) (0.0564853) 
 
Constant 0.7012766 0.3918326 *** 0.7664896 ***
(0.4550524) (0.0216013) (0.2508358) 
Wald test (P-value) 0.0967 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations 57 57 45 
*** Denotes significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Model I is the benchmark tobit model. 
Model II is a weighted tobit model. In model III, we drop the regions whose SW is not sufficiently 
representative due to small sample. 
  As aforementioned, there might be sample-selection bias problem in our 
estimation. To deal with this problem, following Javorcik and Saggi (2010), we 
employ probit model with selection for each year. We estimate a two-stage model 
where the first stage examines the decision on investment and the second stage 
describes the decision on ownership structure. The results indicate that IPR protection 
remains significantly and negatively correlated with the probability of choosing 
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wholly-owned subsidiaries for data from both 2003 and 2004.33 The estimation 
results are shown in table 4.8. 
Table 4.8  Estimation Results in Two-stage Probit Model with Selection  
 2003 2004 2005 
Ownership Decision       
IPR index -1.082*** -0.918** 0.576* 
 (-3.41) (-2.93) (2.05) 
Industry dummy1 0.0289 -0.0959 -0.0589 
(Metal & Machinery) (0.31) (-0.93) (-0.61) 
Industry dummy2 0.360*** 0.405*** 0.277** 
(Computer & Electronics) (4.01) (3.94) (2.9) 
Industry dummy3 -0.00451 -0.0703 -0.138 
(Chemical) (-0.05) (-0.65) (-1.35) 
R&D intensity (in log) 0.0111* 0.0128* 0.0195** 
 (2.23) (2.23) (3.28) 
Number of employees (in log) 0.0778*** 0.111*** 0.0674** 
 (3.53) (4.67) (3.18) 
Language -0.315 -0.091 -0.737 
 (-0.95) (-0.32) (-1.90) 
Production Dummy -0.0858 -0.199 -0.00456 
 (-0.98) (-1.82) (-0.05) 
Corruption 0.570* 0.264 0.198 
 (2.09) (0.95) (0.7) 
Technology absorption -0.625** 0.0558 -0.364 
 (-2.63) (0.25) (-1.61) 
Technological readiness 0.915** 0.715** -0.582** 
 (3.27) (2.68) (-2.73) 
Sales share -3.276 -0.609 -1.776 
 (-1.74) (-0.31) (-1.12) 
Squared sales share 2.124 -1.396 2.683 
 (0.61) (-0.40) (1.09) 
                                                      
33 We get a positive coefficient for IPR in 2005 but it is insignificant at regular significance level 5%. 
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Constant 1.762* -0.758 2.359* 
 (2.09) (-0.67) (2.09) 
Investment Decision       
IPR index 0.919*** -0.718*** -0.807*** 
 (11.48) (-6.17) (-6.78) 
Industry dummy1 -0.0788 -0.0694 -0.0553 
(Metal & Machinery) (-1.64) (-1.30) (-1.03) 
Industry dummy2 -0.0357 -0.044 -0.0238 
(Computer & Electronics) (-0.82) (-0.90) (-0.48) 
Industry dummy3 -0.0459 -0.0625 -0.0377 
(Chemical) (-0.90) (-1.10) (-0.66) 
R&D intensity (in log) 0.00122 0.00163 0.00248 
 (0.48) (0.55) (0.82) 
Number of employees (in log) -0.0114 -0.0045 -0.00742 
 (-1.09) (-0.41) (-0.70) 
Language 1.548*** 1.541*** 1.854*** 
 (-41.65) -28.39 -41.71 
Corruption -0.584*** 0.923*** -0.0964 
 (-9.31) (9.11) (-0.93) 
Technology absorption 0.854*** 0.724*** 1.106*** 
 (15.04) (11.8) (12.01) 
Technological readiness -0.319*** 0.420*** 0.336*** 
 (-3.71) (4.75) (4.59) 
GDP (in log) 0.187*** 0.348*** 0.290*** 
(15.07) (29.03) (13.68) 
GDP per capita (in log) -0.598*** -0.759*** -0.165*** 
(-13.81) (-19.28) (-3.76) 
Constant -6.397*** -10.18*** -7.251*** 
 (-22.02) (-27.88) (-12.21) 
Number of observations  
(number of firms times number of regions)
35720 32509 31673 
*** Denotes significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
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 One may argue that some host countries are developed economies, which have 
higher technology level than Taiwan. In the following robustness check, we exclude 
observations whose FDI host country is a developed economy and run the two-stage 
probit model with sample selection. Firms whose FDI host country/region is USA, 
West Europe, Japan or Singapore are excluded from the sample since these 
countries/regions have higher scores in the index of technology readiness in the 
Global Competitiveness Report for all years in 2003, 2004 and 2005. The results are 
provided in table 4.9. By comparing the results in table 4.9 to those in table 4.8, we 
find that the effect of IPR on firms’ ownership structure becomes stronger.  
 
 
Table 4.9  Estimation Results in Two-stage Probit Model with Selection for 
Developing Host Economies 
 2003 2004 2005 
Ownership Decision    
IPR index -1.283*** -1.335 0.836 
 (-3.66) (-1.31) (1.95) 
Industry dummy1 -0.00588 -0.103 -0.0611 
(Metal & Machinery) (-0.06) (-0.96) (-0.59) 
Industry dummy2 0.385*** 0.397*** 0.310** 
(Computer & Electronics) (3.9) (3.65) (3.04) 
Industry dummy3 -0.0281 -0.0608 -0.0948 
(Chemical) (-0.26) (-0.54) (-0.86) 
R&D intensity (in log) 0.0138* 0.0119 0.0230*** 
 (2.53) (1.9) (3.85) 
Number of employees (in log) 0.0753** 0.119*** 0.0597* 
 (3) (4.65) (2.54) 
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Language 0.173 0.157 -0.442 
 (0.34) (0.5) (-1.09) 
Production Dummy -0.0249 -0.225 0.134 
 (-0.22) (-1.72) (1.13) 
Corruption 0.283 0.193 -0.0462 
 (0.56) (0.22) (-0.18) 
Technology absorption -0.507 0.163 -0.336 
 (-1.39) (0.69) (-1.18) 
Technological readiness 1.227*** 1.099* -0.659* 
 (3.31) (2.44) (-2.13) 
Sales share -3.08 -0.191 -1.366 
 (-1.51) (-0.09) (-0.80) 
Squared sales share 1.679 -2.103 2.195 
 (0.45) (-0.59) (0.85) 
Constant 1.307 -1.271 2.073 
 (1.1) (-0.75) (1.36) 
Investment Decision    
IPR index 0.860*** -2.467*** -1.648*** 
 (10.57) (-11.29) (-11.08) 
Industry dummy1 -0.0669 -0.0669 -0.0618 
(Metal & Machinery) (-1.26) (-1.13) (-1.04) 
Industry dummy2 -0.161*** -0.158** -0.145** 
(Computer & Electronics) (-3.29) (-2.84) (-2.60) 
Industry dummy3 -0.0534 -0.0543 -0.0467 
(Chemical) (-0.95) (-0.86) (-0.73) 
R&D intensity (in log) -0.00669* -0.0104** -0.00883* 
 (-2.34) (-3.11) (-2.56) 
Number of employees (in log) 0.0104 0.0223 0.0139 
 (0.87) (1.77) (1.13) 
Language 1.392*** 1.198*** 1.603*** 
 (26.67) (17.72) (23.24) 
Corruption -1.052*** 2.029*** 0.616*** 
 (-14.52) (10.78) (4.38) 
Technology absorption 1.255*** 0.445*** 2.200*** 
 (15.79) (5.16) (13.94) 
Technological readiness -0.162 1.256*** 0.590*** 
 (-1.63) (9.04) (6.29) 
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GDP (in log) 0.255*** 0.332*** 0.509*** 
(14.14) (16.04) (14.04) 
GDP per capita (in log) -0.440*** -0.681*** -0.369*** 
(-10.42) (-16.16) (-7.12) 
Constant -7.169*** -10.53*** -15.02*** 
 (-20.16) (-26.14) (-13.91) 
Number of observations 
(number of firms times number of regions)
28200 25665 25005 
*** Denotes significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
 
7. Conclusions 
How IPR protection affects the choice of FDI mode by foreign investors is 
interesting to developing countries. More and more evidence show that joint ventures 
with foreign investors can bring in higher technology spillovers. Based on this 
hypothesis, we provide a simple theoretical model and empirical work to show that 
IPR protection is a significant determinant for foreign investors’ choice of FDI mode. 
By analyzing Taiwanese manufacturing multinational enterprises from 2003 to 2005, 
we find that MNEs are more likely to choose joint ventures (wholly owned 
subsidiaries) if IPR protection in the FDI host country is strong (weak). Our finding 
suggests that on average one unit increase in IPR strength increases the probability of 
joint venture by 13.5 percent. We also find that market size and factor price as well as 
consumer’s WTP of the host country affect FDI mode. MNEs prefer wholly owned 
subsidiaries to joint ventures in countries with large markets and high labor cost as 
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well as high consumer’s WTP. We also find that R&D intensity is statistical 
significant in determining the ownership structure. However, the magnitude is very 
small since our results show that 1 percent increase in R&D expenditure per employee 
results in 0.5 percent increase in probability of wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Our finding has an important policy implication. In order to increase local 
participation, the FDI host country may directly impose local equity requirements. 
However, this would not be a best choice since the local equity requirements may 
reduce foreign investors’ incentive to invest in that country. We can imagine that if 
there are two countries that are identical in all aspects except the policy on local 
equality requirement, it is not surprising that the MNE will invest in the country 
where there is no local equality requirement. Alternatively, the results of this study 
suggest that by strengthening IPR protection, developing countries can increase local 
participation without imposing regulations that are harmful for encouraging inward 
FDI. 
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Appendix 
 
Random Effect Probit Estimation with Binary Choice Model 
 
Let’s consider the following binary choice model with x୧୲ being the K ൈ 1 vector 
of independent variable and α୧ representing the unobserved individual specific effect 
 
 φ୧୲ ൌ ൜1 ሺwholly ownedሻ if and only if φ୧୲
כ ൌ α୧ ൅ X୧୲ᇱ β ൅ Ԗ୧୲ ൐ 0
0 ሺjoint venturesሻ if and only if φ୧୲כ ൌ α୧ ൅ X୧୲ᇱ β ൅ Ԗ୧୲ ൑ 0 (A01)
 
In a random effect probit model, the following assumptions apply: 
1) α୧~Nሺ0, σαଶሻ;  
2) Ԗ୧୲~Nሺ0, σ஫ଶሻ;  
3) α୧ and Ԗ୧୲ are mutually independent as well as independent of x୧୲.  
Thus, we should have 
 
φ୧୲ ൌ ቊ
1 ሺwholly ownedሻ if and only if φ୧୲כ ൌ X୧୲′ β ൅ u୧୲ ൐ 0
0 ሺjoint venturesሻ if and only if φ୧୲כ ൌ X୧୲′ β ൅ u୧୲ ൑ 0
  (A02) 
 
where u୧୲ ൌ α୧ ൅ Ԗ୧୲~Nሺ0, σଶሻ with σଶ ൌ σαଶ ൅ σ஫ଶ. Our panel data cover 3 periods; 
therefore, the joint probability becomes: 
 
 P൫φ୧ଵ,φ୧ଶ,φ୧ଷ൯ ൌ ׬ ׬ ׬ fሺu୧ଵ, u୧ଶ, u୧ଷሻdu୧ଷdu୧ଶdu୧ଵୠ౟యୟ౟య
ୠ౟మ
ୟ౟మ
ୠ౟భ
ୟ౟భ   (A03)
 
where a୧୲ ൌ െx୧୲′ β  and b୧୲ ൌ ∞  if φ୧୲ ൌ 1  and a୧୲ ൌ െ∞  and b୧୲ ൌ െx୧୲′ β  if 
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φ୧୲ ൌ 0. Following Butler and Moffitt (1982), since u୧୲|α୧ and u୧ୱ|α୧ (t ് s) are 
independent, when conditioning on the random disturbance term α୧, the joint density 
function in (A03) can be rewritten as  
 fሺu୧ଵ, u୧ଶ, u୧ଷሻ ൌ fሺα୧ሻfሺu୧ଵ, u୧ଶ, u୧ଷ|α୧ሻ ൌfሺα୧ሻfሺu୧ଵ|α୧ሻfሺu୧ଶ|α୧ሻfሺu୧ଷ|α୧ሻ  (A04)
 
  Therefore, (A03) becomes  
 
P൫φ୧ଵ,φ୧ଶ,φ୧ଷ൯ ൌ
׬ fሺα୧ሻ∞ି∞ ׬ fሺu୧ଵ|α୧ሻdu୧ଵ
ୠ౟భ
ୟ౟భ ׬ fሺu୧ଶ|α୧ሻdu୧ଶ
ୠ౟మ
ୟ౟మ ׬ fሺu୧ଷ|α୧ሻdu୧ଷ
ୠ౟య
ୟ౟య dα୧  
 ൌ ׬ ∏ ሾFሺb୧୲|α୧ሻ െ Fሺa୧୲|α୧ሻሿଷ୲ୀଵ fሺα୧ሻ∞ି∞ dα୧  
(A05)
 
  The likelihood function can be obtained by multiplying each individual’s 
probability obtained from (A05). Taking logarithm on the likelihood function, the 
log-likelihood function is: 
 
 ln L ൌ ∑ ln൛׬ ∏ ሾFሺb୧୲|α୧ሻ െ Fሺa୧୲|α୧ሻሿଷ୲ୀଵ fሺα୧ሻ∞ି∞ dα୧ൟN୧ୀଵ   (A06)
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis discusses three independent topics regarding intellectual property 
rights protection and international trade. In the framework of horizontal arbitrage 
model in PI analysis, I show that allowing PI encourages the manufacture to find 
other ways such as offering the product as well as better service to mitigate price 
competition. The intuition is as follows. In contrast to investment in brand marketing, 
which can be freely ridden by parallel importers, investment in service is excludable 
and thus the manufacturer has an incentive to invest more in service in order to 
achieve product differentiation.  
The horizontal arbitrage framework is applied to the analysis of piracy and 
parallel imports in the video game market. Three results that are different from 
common expectations are developed. First, video game piracy could be beneficial for 
both hardware manufacture and software provider since neither of them will be 
pinned down by each other with the existence of piracy. Second, allowing PI for 
hardware is also beneficial for the hardware manufacturer since piracy and PI provide 
the hardware firm a means to distinguish consumers’ type and thus price 
discrimination can be sustained. Third, this study shows that consumers are not 
necessarily better off due to parallel importation.  
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An essay that discussed the nexus between IPR and mode of FDI is included in 
this thesis. By analyzing a firm-level panel data set from Taiwanese multinational 
manufacturing firms for the period 2003-2005, I find that MNEs are more likely to 
choose joint ventures if IPR protection in the FDI host country is strong. The 
estimation results suggest that one unit increase in IPR protection in the average 
country raises the probability of joint ventures by 13.5 percent. I also find that MNEs 
prefer wholly owned subsidiaries to joint ventures in host countries with large markets 
and high factor price as well as high average income.  
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